mandamus | Unpublished Junk Law of the Eleventh Circuit, US Court of Appeals

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Another One Bites the Dust: Same Set of Facts, Judge Graham Affirmed While Colleague Judge Forrester Reversed

July 24, 2008

Justice Turned On Its Head

Judge Donald L. Graham, “Teflon Don”

It is hard not to conclude that Judge Donald L. Graham is more valued than his colleagues at the Southern District of Florida and in the Eleventh Circuit when Judge Graham “teflon don” is affirmed on appeal while his colleagues at the S.D. Fla. and elsewhere in the Eleventh Circuit are reversed. In this post, U.S. Dist. J. Owen Forrester is “victimized” by the published opinion. This is the fifth of five postings on this site where this has happened. U.S. Dist. Judges Daniel T. K. Hurley, Ursula Ungaro-Benages, Marvin H. Shoob, and William P. Dimitrouleas, met similar fates. See posting this site, “Eleventh Circuit Uses Same Set of Facts To Reverse One Florida Judge While Affirming Another Florida Judge“, ““Teflon Don” Avoids Reversal While Colleague Judge Ursula Ungaro-Benages Suffers Reversal“, U.S. Dist. Judge William P. Dimitrouleas Reversed While Colleague Judge Donald L. Graham Affirmed by Killing The Appeal, and Eleventh Circuit Uses Unpublished Opinion and Omission(Deception) To Invoke Res Judicata. In each case the Eleventh Circuit chose to deploy an unpublished opinion to affirm and protect Judge Graham while his colleagues suffered reversals in published opinions. It is difficult to see how such a system advances the notion of equal justice. It would seem that justice is a function not of the “rule of law”, but of whether or not the judge is favored by the appellate courts.

Mason sought to appeal a sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction that was rendered by U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham on September 20, 2001. See “The Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction“, heading below. Sua sponte issued pre-filing injunctions are void because they are issued without notice and opportunity to respond or due process. See, Case Law On Pre-Filing Injunctions, below. Additionally, this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction is void because it made a so-called “finding of bad-faith” without the requisite notice and opportunity to respond or due process. The Eleventh Circuit has a long history of refusing to review this clearly void sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction. See Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals, Sets Guiness World Record For Refusing to Review.

Judicial Independence

This post is a part of the overall scheme to land a knockout blow to the American Bar Association’s koolaid of “Judicial Independence”. The ABA’s emphasis is on “Judicial Independence” and it resists “interference” from outsiders-Congress of the United States, Layman review boards. The ABA has said: “There are checks on the judiciary and channels to correct improper decisions. The appeal process affords litigants the opportunity to challenge a judicial ruling.” About Us – ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence. This is the idealistic and theoretical basis for “Judicial Independence”; however, the reality or actual practice does not equal the ideals. Suppose for a moment that such a system does not work. Federal Judges will take extreme measures to avoid disciplining a colleague federal judge. See Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664: The Appeal From Hell for even more dishonest jurisprudence. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit will do anything to achieve the desired outcome. Two posts at this site, mcneilmason.wordpress.com, document how the Eleventh Circuit will do anything to achieve the desired outcome as the Eleventh took two different and inconsistent positions with respect to the jurisdiction of the lower court or Judge Graham during the appeal of this very appeal. See Eleventh Circuit: Notice of Appeal Does Not Divest District Judge of Jurisdiction of Matters Involved In the Appeal! and Putrid Dishonesty:Beyond the Scope of Appeal.

Judge J. Owen Forrester and the Published Opinion

U.S. Dist. Judge J. Owen Forrester was reversed on appeal where he dismissed a prisoner 28 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights lawsuit, sua sponte, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the statute of limitations precluded the prisoner from stating a claim. On July 20, 2000, the district court entered a two and one-half page order dismissing Leal’s suit, sua sponte, under the PLRA’s screening provisions, 27 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Arsenio Leal v. Georgia Department Of Corrections, 254 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2001). On August 23, 2000, the prisoner filed his notice of appeal from the dismissal. Ultimately, the court held that the notice of appeal was timely filed and proceeded to reverse Judge Forrester. If the Eleventh Circuit had used the same “rule of law” it used in Marcellus Mason v. Highlands County Board of County Commissioners, et.al., Case No. 02-14646-A, D. C. Case No. 99-14027-CIV-Graham, U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham, presiding, then it should have dismissed the appeal as untimely and not reversed Judge Forrester.

However, in Judge Forrester’s case, Arsenio Leal v. Georgia Department Of Corrections, 254 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2001), the Eleventh Circuit held that

However, the 30-day appeal period does not begin to run until a final judgment is entered on a separate document pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 58 and 79(a).2 See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7) (“A judgment or order is entered for purposes of Rule 4(a) when it is entered in compliance with Rule 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”). Here, the district court entered an order dismissing Leal’s suit on July 20, but the court failed to enter a final judgment on a separate document pursuant to Rule 58. Because “the time to file a notice of appeal does not begin to run until a separate judgment is entered pursuant to Rule 58 . . . there is no lack of appellate jurisdiction on the basis of untimeliness” even though Leal did not file his notice of appeal until August 23.

Similarly, in Reynolds v. Golden Corral Corporation, 213 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2000), the Eleventh Circuit held that

“[C]ases from both the Supreme Court and the circuit courts of appeal make it clear that the time to file a notice of appeal does not begin to run until a separate judgment is entered pursuant to Rule 58. See, e.g., United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 93 S.Ct. 1562 (1973).”

As documented below, the Eleventh Circuit in an unpublished decision, Eleventh Circuit Case No. 02-14646-A, held that a notice of appeal was untimely where it preceded the final judgment. Unlike Arsenio Leal and Reynolds, the Eleventh Circuit held that Marcellus Mason’s notice of appeal, June 24, 2002, was untimely even though it preceded the final judgment, September 13, 2002 by almost three months. Stated alternatively, there was no separate final judgment when Mason filed his notice of appeal.

Judge Donald L. Graham and the Unpublished Opinion

Eleventh Circuit Case No. 02-14646-A

D. C. Case No. 99-14027-CIV, Teflon Don, presiding.

On February 19, 2002, Defendants, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners, et.al. filed a Motion for Entry of Final Judgment. (D.E. #897).

On September 13, 2002, the Defendant’s Motion for Entry of Final Judgment was granted and a final judgment was entered. See (D.E. #911). Judge Graham stated:

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion for Entry of Final Judgment (D.E. 897)…ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED. Final Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant and costs….

See (D.E. #911).

On October 7, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit, United States Court of Appeal stated:

This appeal is DISMISSED, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant Marcellus Mason’s notice of appeal, filed on June 24, 2002, is untimely from the district court’s order enjoining him from filing additional pleadings, entered on September 21, 2001. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(A) & 26(a)(3).

No motion for reconsideration may be filed unless it complies with the timing and other requirements of 11th Cir.R. 40-4 and all other applicable rules.

Long History of Refusing to Review the Sua Sponte Issued Pre-filing Injunction

The Eleventh Circuit has refused to review the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction no less than eight (8) times. The reasons for refusing to review the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction is different each time. The following cases provided the Eleventh Circuit with the opportunity to review the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction:

Case No. 01-13664-A, Direct Appeal, Oct. 16, 2002 is particularly offensive because the Eleventh Circuit struck Mason’s appellate brief because it argued against that the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction that the Eleventh Circuit stated was “beyond the scope of appeal”. However, when the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Judge Graham in its decision it then used the same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction to affirm Judge Graham. See Putrid Dishonesty:Beyond the Scope of Appeal. This appeal, Case No. 01-13664 has been referred to as the “appeal from hell”. See Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664: The Appeal From Hell. Lastly, and even more offensive and egregious, the Eleventh Circuit sat idly by while Mason was being railroaded in a kangaroo court for contempt based solely upon this clearly void sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction. See Eleventh Circuit Sits Idly By While A Clearly Void Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction Wreaks Havoc On A Man’s Life. Clearly, a decision has been taken that Judge Graham’s career is more important than Mason’s life.

The Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction

On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham rendered a pre-fling injunction sua sponte, or on his own motion and without notice to the litigant Marcellus M. Mason. See Docket Entry Number 878, (D.E. # 878) . Page 3, of this document boldly asserts: THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte. This type of injunction is commonly referred to under several different names: “leave to file injunction”, “vexatious litigant injunction”, “pre-filing injunction”, “filing injunction”, “1651 injunction”. This order was rendered when the matter had been on appeal since June 25, 2001. This fact creates a potential jurisdictional problem. See Post, “Eleventh Circuit: Notice of Appeal Does Not Divest District Judge of Jurisdiction of Matters Involved In the Appeal!” to see how the Eleventh Circuit dishonestly handled this problem. For specific case law on sua sponte issued injunctions, See Case Law On Pre-Filing Injunctions, below. This same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction that Mason was not notice given notice and opportunity to respond to makes a so-called “finding of bad faith” that was subsequently used to award a heavily insured governmental entity attorney’s fees of $200,000. At pages 5,6, this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction asserts:

It has become clear to the Court that Mason is proceeding in bad faith. Indeed, he has admitted as much in his own pleadings and correspondence…Such activity is in bad faith and will not be permitted by the Court.

A finding of bad faith requires due process as well. ” “A court must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power, and it must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees,..” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991). See also Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir., 2001)(A court should be cautious in exerting its inherent power and “must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees.” ). See Judge Donald L. Graham Awards $200,000 Attorney’s Fees Against An Indigent. Apparently, Judge Graham does not have to do a damn thing even if the United States Supreme requires it.

The U.S. Supreme Court,”SCOTUS”, On the Importance of Due Process

“Courts as well as citizens are not free ‘to ignore all the procedures of the law….’. The ‘constitutional freedom’ of which the Court speaks can be won only if judges honor the Constitution.” Walker v. City Of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 338 (1967)(Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting). “Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole, constitutional system.” Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring). It is ingrained in our national traditions, and is designed to maintain them. In a variety of situations, the Court has enforced this requirement by checking attempts of executives, legislatures, and lower courts to disregard the deep-rooted demands of fair play enshrined in the Constitution.” id. 161. “Fairness of procedure is “due process in the primary sense.” Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 281 U. S. 681.

In a long line of cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that impingements of constitutional rights are, without variation, subject to the strictures of “due process” or notice and opportunity to be heard prior to their enactments. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Owen v. City Of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Carey v.Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).

Right of Access To Courts is Constitutionally Protected

The right of access to the Courts is clear according to the U.S. Supreme Court. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977);M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). The Supreme court has stated the right of access to the courts also protected by the First Amendment. BE&K Construction CO. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. 536 U.S. 516 (2001)(“the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government,” and that “[t]he right of access to the courts is … but one aspect of the right of petition.“). California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972)(“The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.“). See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)(recognizing “the fundamental right of access to the courts”); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)(“The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to hallenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights.“).

Case Law On Pre-Filing Injunctions

US CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS HAVE ROUTINELY REJECTED “SUA SPONTE” PRE-FILING INJUNCTIONS.

A long line of United States appellate courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, have rejected sua sponte issuances of pre-filing injunctions because they are violations of due process. In Weaver v. Leon County Sch. Bd., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8128 (11^th Cir. 2006), the Eleventh Circuit held that a litigant was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a restriction was imposed on his ability to challenge an injunction. U.S. v. Powerstein, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 14928,*;185 Fed. Appx. 811 (11th Cir. 2006)(litigant entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the court imposed the injunctive order ). See Sires v. Fair, 107 F.3d 1;1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2173 (1^st Cir. 1997); Cok v. Family Court of Rhode Island , 985 F.2d 32 (C.A.1 (R.I.), 1993) (vacating a pre-fling injunction issued without notice); MLE Realty Assocs. v. Handler, 192 F.3d 259, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23362 (2^nd Cir. 1999) ; Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121 (2^nd Cir. 2000) ; Holton v. Oral Surg. Sing Sing Corr., 24 Fed. Appx. 37; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25151 (2^nd Cir. 2001); Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 1998) (district court may not impose a filing injunction on a litigant without providing the litigant with notice and an opportunity to be heard.); Gonzales v. Feiner, 131 Fed. Appx. 373, * 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8370, ** (3^rd Cir. 2005) ; Wiliams v. Cambridge Integrated Servs. Group , 148 Fed Appx. 87, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 18624 (3^rd Cir. 2005) ; Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027 (C.A.3 (Virgin Islands), 1992)(vacating a sua sponte issued injunction); It is imperative that the court afford the litigant notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to issuing such an injunction. In Re Head, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8265,*;174 Fed. Appx. 167 (4^th Cir. 2006)(vacated a 10 yr. old sua sponte injunction); Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 819 (4th Cir. 2004)(vacating a pre-filing injunction issued without notice); Tucker v. Drew, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11784 (4 ^thCir. 1994) ;DOUGLAS BAUM v. BLUE MOON VENTURES, LLC , 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 91,*;513 F.3d 181;49 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 68 (5th Cir. 2008)(“Notice and a hearing are required if the district court sua sponte imposes a pre-filing injunction or sua sponte modifies an existing injunction to deter vexatious filings.”) ;De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9^th Cir.) ; Roscoe v. Hansen, 107 F.3d 880;1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4996 (10^th Cir. 1997); Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20966,*;500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007)(litigant must be given notice and a chance to be heard before the [injunctive] order is entered.); Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351,354 (C.A.10 (Wyo.), 1989)(vacated and holding that the litigant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to oppose the court’s order before it is instituted.); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F.Supp. 146 (M.D. Fla., 1983)(court issued a show cause order) Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1110 (C.A.11 (Fla.), 1985) (held that district court did give adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before issuance of the injunction); Cofield v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm., 936 F.2d 512, 514 (11th Cir.1991)(noting that court issued show cause order prior to rendering pre-fling injunction); In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C.Cir.1988)(reversing and holding If a pro se litigant is to be deprived of such a vital constitutional right as access to the courts, he should, at least, be provided with an opportunity to oppose the entry of an order restricting him before it is entered.); Martin v. Circuit Court, 627 So.2d 1298 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., 1993)(reversing a pre-filing order and holding that limiting the constitutional right of access to the courts, essential due process safeguards must first be provided); Lawsuits of Carter, In re, 510 S.E.2d 91, 95; 235 Ga.App. 551 (Ga. App., 1998)(reversing a pre-filing injunction because notice or an opportunity not given); Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that injunctions “may not be expanded beyond the meaning of its terms absent notice and an opportunity to be heard.”).

Courts have felt that the notice and opportunity to respond was so important that they have reversed district courts even where they thought the pre-filing injunction was otherwise valid. See Oliver, In re, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (C.A.3 (Pa.), 1982); Scott v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage , 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15709,*;143 Fed. Appx. 525(4^th Cir. 2005);Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987). The United States Supreme Court has stated: A court must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power, and it must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees. (emphasis added) Chambers v.Nasco, Inc.,501U.S. 32, 50 (1991).

Tags:"ABA", 01-13664-A, 01-15754, 01-16218, 02-11476-A, 04-11894, 05-10623-I, 11th Cir.R. 40-4, 213 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2000), 254 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2001), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1983, 30-day appeal period, American Bar Association, appellate jurisdiction, Arsenio Leal v. Georgia Department Of Corrections, beyond the scope of appeal, Case No. 02-14646, Case No. 99-14027-CIV-Graham, clearly void, failure to state a claim, Fed.R.App.P. 26(a)(3), Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(A), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 58, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 79(a), final judgment, Judge J. Owen Forrester, judicial independence, koolaid, mandamus, notice of appeal, Reynolds v. Golden Corral Corporation, Rule 58, separate document, Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction, teflon don, This appeal is DISMISSED, U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham, Unpublished decision, unpublished opinion, untimeliness
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Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals, Sets Guiness World Record For Refusing to Review Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction

June 12, 2008

Judge Donald L. Graham, “Teflon Don”

Foreword

There’s an old Negro spiritual called “May the Work I’ve Done Speak for Me”. In this same spirit, this author allows the work of the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal and Judge Graham’s cohorts to speak for them. Unlike, Judge Graham, the Eleventh Circuit and his enablers apparent zeal and affinity for dishonesty, mis-characterization, omission, their work will not be characterized or mis-characterized it will be produced in full and publicly available for the reading public to make their own assessments. The record fully supports the idea that the Eleventh Circuit and its Judges and staff attorneys will take extreme, even lawless measures to protect Judge Graham. This post is part of an overall pattern and practice of using extreme measures and lawlessness to conceal the misconduct of Judge Graham. See Documented Allegations of Misconduct.

How Many Times Can a Court Refuse to Review an Order For Validity?

This post will demonstrate that the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals has set a Guinness world record for refusing to review a clearly void sua sponte pre-filing injunction that was rendered by “Teflon Don”, U.S. District Judge Donald L. Graham on September 20, 2001. The Eleventh Circuit has declined to reach the merits of this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction on multiple occasions. The denials invoke a kind of creative dishonesty. As a matter of fact, the denials are not consistent and even contradict each other on each successive attempt at appellate review. Even an ardent supporter of the system would have a hard time arguing that there is not a certain amount of dishonesty involved in the matter. The point here is that there has never been any appellate review of the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001. Yet this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction has been used as a weapon against Marcellus Mason. The Eleventh Circuit has elevated artifice to a level that would make a shister lawyer proud. The coup de grace is the Eleventh Circuit sat idly by while this clearly void sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction was used to form the basis of a criminal contempt complaint and conviction. See this outrageous story, “Eleventh Circuit Sits Idly By While A Clearly Void Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction Wreaks Havoc On A Man’s Life“.

Judicial Independence

This post also makes vividly clear why federal judges cannot and should not be trusted to discipline themselves. The information provided in this post is not only true, but you would not be able to get this information anywhere else. The Eleventh Circuit relies on ignorance and the public’s willingness to believe that its federal judges are honest, diligent, and trustworthy. America should not drink the American Bar Association’s, “ABA”, koolaid of judicial independence.

The Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction

On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham rendered a pre-fling injunction sua sponte, or on his own motion and without notice to the litigant Marcellus M. Mason. See Docket Entry Number 878, (D.E. # 878) . Page 3, of this document boldly asserts: THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte. This type of injunction is commonly referred to under several different names: “leave to file injunction”, “vexatious litigant injunction”, “pre-filing injunction”, “filing injunction”, “1651 injunction”. This order was rendered when the matter had been on appeal since June 25, 2001. This fact creates a potential jurisdictional problem. See Post, “Eleventh Circuit: Notice of Appeal Does Not Divest District Judge of Jurisdiction of Matters Involved In the Appeal!” to see how the Eleventh Circuit dishonestly handled this problem. For specific case law on sua sponte issued injunctions, see Case Law On Pre-Filing Injunctions, below. This same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction that Mason was not notice given notice and opportunity to respond to makes a so-called “finding of bad faith” that was subsequently used to award a heavily insured governmental entity attorney’s fees of $200,000. At pages 5,6, this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction asserts:

It has become clear to the Court that Mason is proceeding in bad faith. Indeed, he has admitted as much in his own pleadings and correspondence…Such activity is in bad faith and will not be permitted by the Court.

Case No. 01-13664-A, Direct Appeal

The unpublished opinion rendered in this matter is a joke and model of dishonesty and deserved its own page and is a must read, see “Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664: The Appeal From Hell”

This appeal was docketed under Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664. The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 27, 2001. See Docket No. 795.

On Mar. 6, 2002, the court strikes the Appellants’ Brief arguing against the September 20, 2001 order. The court states the order is “beyond the scope of appeal”. Court orders Mason to go through the expense of filing new briefs that have no reference to the September 20, 2001.

On Apr. 23, 2002, Court Strikes Appellees brief for citing the order of September 20, 2001.However court refuses to make Appellees file new briefs as they did the Appellant.

On Oct. 16, 2002, the Court, Stanley F. Birch, Jr.,Susan H. Black, and Stanley Marcus, affirms Judge Graham.At pg. 14, Court specifically uses the September 20, 2001 that it stated to Mason was “beyond the scope of appeal”.

“Moreover, despite the closure of the case by the district court, Mason’s continual filing of motions with the court addressing matters previously settled prompted the district court to prohibit Mason from further filings without explicit permission and initiate criminal contempt proceedings.Therefore, the record supports the districts court’s implicit finding that a sanction less than dismissal of the action with prejudice would have no effect.”

Case No, 01-15754, Mandamus

The Judges responsible for making this decision are Judges Susan H. Black, Rosemary Barkett, and Stanley Marcus. The Eleventh Circuit received a mandamus petition that was docketed as being received on October 2, 2001. See Receipt. This is a 25 page petition plus exhibits. Microsoft Word Format, html format, and pdf format. This petition attacks the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001. The Eleventh Circuit Court had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 from the moment the injunction of September 20, 2001 was issued even if the case was not closed like the matter at bar. According to the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit’s own binding precedents, this mandamus petition should have been treated as a notice of appeal. The Defendant, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners, and U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham also received a copy of the mandamus petition. Judge Graham did not file a brief in opposition to the petition. The Defendant did not file a responsive brief to the petition. The Eleventh Circuit did not require anyone to respond the petition.

For more on this mandamus, see this site post “Eleventh Circuit Disses The U.S. Supreme Court Chooses To Protect Judge Graham”

In reply to the 25 page petition on December 5, 2001, the Eleventh Circuit rendered the following “Opinion”:

“The “petition for writ of mandamus and petition for writ of prohibition” is DENIED.” See “Opinion“, Case No. 01-15754.

Mason filed a motion for clarification seeking to know the basis upon which the decision was made or what the opinion stood for, however the Eleventh Circuit declined to discuss the matter.

Rehearing Denied

On January 25, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit denied a motion for clarification:

Petitioner’s “motion for reconsideration and clarification” of this Court’s December 5, 2001, Order, is DENIED as Petitioner has offered no reason sufficient to warrant either reconsideration or clarification of this Court’s Order.

Rehearing Denied

On or about February 06, 2004, Judges Susan H. Black, Rosemary Barkett, and Stanley Marcus were sent certified letters begging them to decide this matter. However, each of them declined to respond or do anything.

Case No. 01-16218

Judge Frank Hull rendered this opinion. On January 8, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit stated:

Although Mason has not filed a from the district court’s order denying IFP or the omnibus order requiring Mason to get court approval before filing any additional pleadings or lawsuits, Mason may raise all of these issues on appeal. See generally, Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107 (11 th Cir. 1985) (reviewing the district court’s order enjoining a defendants from filing additional pleadings unless they were first submitted by an attorney admitted to practice in that court); United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966 (11th Cir. 1999) (reviewing a district court’s decision not to recuse itself for abuse of discretion); Camp v. Oliver, 798 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1996) (reviewing district court’s order denying IFP for abuse of discretion).

See Opinion Case No. 01-16218.

Case No. 02-11476-A

On May 1, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit, Judge Joel F. Dubina, stated:

Mason also requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order enjoining Mason from to Mason’s former employment without first receiving permission from the district court. Although Mason has not filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s order requiring him to receive the permission of the district court from filing any additional pleadings or from filing any new lawsuits related to his former employment or subsequent interactions with the defendants, Mason may raise this issue on appeal. See generally, Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1985) (reviewing the district court’s order enjoining a defendant from filing additional pleadings unless they were first submitted by an attorney submitted by an attorney admitted to practice in that court). Mason has an adequate alternative remedy on appeal regarding this issue.

See Opinion Case No. 02-11476-A. This is quite a remarkable and incredible statement by Judge Dubina in that by May 1, 2002, as fully set forth above, the Eleventh Circuit has already declined to review this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction twice. See above, Case No. 01-15754 denied mandamus on December 5, 2001, and Case No. 01-13664-A, the brief was stricken on March 6, 2002 because it was said to be “beyond the scope of appeal”, then the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction used against Mason on October 16, 2002.

Case No. 02-14646, Mandamus

Judges R. Lanier Anderson, Joel F. Dubina, and Charles R. Wilson names are on this decision. On Oct. 7, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit stated:

This Appeal is DISMISSED, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant Marcellus Mason’s notice of appeal, filed on June 24, 2002, is untimely from the district court’s order enjoining him from filing additional pleading, entered on September 21, 2001.

Case No. 04-11894, Mandamus

Judges Ed Carnes and Frank M. Hull names appear on this opinion. On May 20, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit, among other things, admits to the following:

(2) vacatur of all of the decisions Judge Graham made in his case, including a September 20, 2001 order; (3) this Court to direct Judge Moore to dismiss his contempt case, number 02-14020-CR-KMM; and (4) this Court to issue an “emergency stay” with respect to the contempt case.

pg. 1, Opinion Case No. 04-11894.

At page 3, the Court asserts:

Moreover, Mason had an adequate alternative remedy to mandamus relief in that he could have timely appealed the September 20, 2001 order, but did not do so.

See pg. 3, Opinion Case No. 04-11894

Case No. 05-10623-I, Mandamus

Judge Rosemary Barkett made this decision. On March 16, 2005, the Eleventh Circuit, among other things, admits to the following:

[V]acate all decisions and rulings by Judge Graham in this case since February 1999, including the September 20, 2001 order enjoining him for filing any pleadings or additional related lawsuit without court; permission.

See Opinion pg. 1, Case No. 05-10623-I.

At pg. 2, the Eleventh Circuit asserted the following:“Furthermore, Mason appealed the dismissal of his case as well as the district court’s injunction order of September of 20, 2001...” See Pg. 2.

This statement is directly contradicted by the Eleventh Circuit’s prior assertion of May 20, 2004, Case No. 04-11894, pg. 4:”Moreover, Mason had an adequate remedy to mandamus relief in that he could have timely appealed the September 20, 2001, but did not do so.”

The Eleventh Circuit has declined to review the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction on other occasions as well. See Appellate History.

The U.S. Supreme Court,”SCOTUS”, On the Importance of Due Process

Right of Access To Courts is Constitutionally Protected

The right of access to the Courts is clear according to the U.S. Supreme Court. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977);M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). The Supreme court has stated the right of access to the courts also protected by the First Amendment. BE&K Construction CO. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. 536 U.S. 516 (2001)(“the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government,” and that “[t]he right of access to the courts is … but one aspect of the right of petition.“). California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972)(“The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.“). See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)(recognizing “the fundamental right of access to the courts”); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)(“The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights.“).

Case Law On Pre-Filing Injunctions

US CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS HAVE ROUTINELY REJECTED “SUA SPONTE” PRE-FILING INJUNCTIONS.

“Numerous persuasive authorities support the idea that due process requires notice and a hearing before a court sua sponte enjoins a party from filing further papers in support of a frivolous claim…Smith’s filing can therefore be construed as a motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). A judgment is void under that rule “‘if the court that rendered it . . . acted in a manner inconsistent [*8] with due process of law.'”..We therefore vacate and remand so that the district court may consider imposing a lesser restriction that will protect against abusive filings without improperly restricting Smith’s right of access to the courts. If the district court decides that an injunction is necessary, Smith should be provided with an opportunity to oppose the injunction before it is instituted. “

It is remarkable that the Eleventh Circuit, sua sponte, or on its own motion, initiated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) to reverse Judge Maurice Mitchell Paul. Also, in Weaver v. Leon County Sch. Bd., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8128 (11^th Cir. 2006), the Eleventh Circuit held that a litigant was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a restriction was imposed on his ability to challenge an injunction. U.S. v. Powerstein, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 14928,*;185 Fed. Appx. 811 (11th Cir. 2006)(litigant entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the court imposed the injunctive order ). See Sires v. Fair, 107 F.3d 1;1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2173 (1^st Cir. 1997); Cok v. Family Court of Rhode Island , 985 F.2d 32 (C.A.1 (R.I.), 1993) (vacating a pre-fling injunction issued without notice); MLE Realty Assocs. v. Handler, 192 F.3d 259, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23362 (2^nd Cir. 1999) ; Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121 (2^nd Cir. 2000) ; Holton v. Oral Surg. Sing Sing Corr., 24 Fed. Appx. 37; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25151 (2^nd Cir. 2001); Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 1998) (district court may not impose a filing injunction on a litigant without providing the litigant with notice and an opportunity to be heard.); Gonzales v. Feiner, 131 Fed. Appx. 373, * 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8370, ** (3^rd Cir. 2005) ; Wiliams v. Cambridge Integrated Servs. Group , 148 Fed Appx. 87, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 18624 (3^rd Cir. 2005) ; Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027 (C.A.3 (Virgin Islands), 1992)(vacating a sua sponte issued injunction); It is imperative that the court afford the litigant notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to issuing such an injunction. In Re Head, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8265,*;174 Fed. Appx. 167 (4^th Cir. 2006)(vacated a 10 yr. old sua sponte injunction);Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 819 (4th Cir. 2004)(vacating a pre-filing injunction issued without notice); Tucker v. Drew, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11784 (4 ^thCir. 1994) ;DOUGLAS BAUM v. BLUE MOON VENTURES, LLC , 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 91,*;513 F.3d 181;49 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 68 (5th Cir. 2008)(“Notice and a hearing are required if the district court sua sponte imposes a pre-filing injunction or sua sponte modifies an existing injunction to deter vexatious filings.”) ;De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9^th Cir.) ; Roscoe v. Hansen, 107 F.3d 880;1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4996 (10^th Cir. 1997); Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20966,*;500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007)(litigant must be given notice and a chance to be heard before the [injunctive] order is entered.); Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351,354 (C.A.10 (Wyo.), 1989)(vacated and holding that the litigant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to oppose the court’s order before it is instituted.); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F.Supp. 146 (M.D. Fla., 1983)(court issued a show cause order) Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1110 (C.A.11 (Fla.), 1985) (held that district court did give adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before issuance of the injunction); Cofield v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm., 936 F.2d 512, 514 (11th Cir.1991)(noting that court issued show cause order prior to rendering pre-fling injunction); In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C.Cir.1988)(reversing and holding If a pro se litigant is to be deprived of such a vital constitutional right as access to the courts, he should, at least, be provided with an opportunity to oppose the entry of an order restricting him before it is entered.); Martin v. Circuit Court, 627 So.2d 1298 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., 1993)(reversing a pre-filing order and holding that limiting the constitutional right of access to the courts, essential due process safeguards must first be provided); Lawsuits of Carter, In re, 510 S.E.2d 91, 95; 235 Ga.App. 551 (Ga. App., 1998)(reversing a pre-filing injunction because notice or an opportunity not given);Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that injunctions “may not be expanded beyond the meaning of its terms absent notice and an opportunity to be heard.”).

Pre-filing Restrictions

1. Plaintiff Marcellus M. Mason is Permanently enjoined

from filing any additional pleadings in case numbers 99-14027- CIV-GRAHAM, 00-14116-CIV-GRAHAM, 00-14201-CIV-GRAHAM, 00-I4202- CIV-GRAHAM, 00-14240-CIV-GRAHAM, 01-14074-CIV-GRAHAM, 01-14078- CIV-GRAHAM, and 01-14230-CIV-GRAHAM or from filing any new lawsuit which relates in any way to Plaintiff Marcellus M. Mason’s former employment and/or subsequent interactions with Defendants without first receiving permission from the Court, as set forth below. This injunction shall apply equally to any persons or entities acting at the behest, direction, or instigation, or in concert with Marcellus M. Mason.

2. Any request for permission to file a new lawsuit relating to the issues in the above captioned cases and/or Mason’s former employment and/or subsequent interactions with Defendants SHALL be in the form of an application filed with the Clerk of Court and addressed to United States District Judge Donald L. Graham. This application shall consist of a one paragraph explanation of the issues in the proposed lawsuit, shall contain the names of all proposed parties and shall not exceed one page. The application shall not include any proposed pleadings.

See Docket Entry No. 878.

Tags:* 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8370, ** (3rd Cir. 2005), *;143 Fed. Appx. 525(4th Cir. 2005);Gagliardi v. McWill, *;174 Fed. Appx. 167 (4th Cir. 2006), *;185 Fed. Appx. 811 (11th Cir. 2006), *;500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007), *;513 F.3d 181;49 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 68 (5th Cir. 2008), 107 F.3d 1;1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2173 (1st Cir. 1997), 107 F.3d 880;1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4996 (10th Cir. 1997), 1296 (11th Cir. 2002), 131 Fed. Appx. 373, 147 F.3d 207, 148 Fed Appx. 87, 174 (1951), 175 F.3d 966 (11th Cir. 1999), 192 F.3d 259, 1982); Scott v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, 1989), 1993), 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11784 (4 th Cir. 1994), 1998), 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23362 (2nd Cir. 1999), 2001, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25151 (2nd Cir. 2001), 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15709, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 18624 (3rd Cir. 2005), 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 14928, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8128 (11th Cir. 2006), 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8265, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20966, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 91, 208 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 229 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2000), 24 Fed. Appx. 37, 281 U. S. 673, 281 U. S. 681., 307 F.3d 1277, 338 (1967), 339 U.S. 306 (1950), 341 U.S. 123, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Goldberg v. Kelly, 354 (C.A.10 (Wyo.), 388 U.S. 307, 390 F.3d 812(4th Cir. 2004), 397 U.S. 254 (1970), 404 U. S. 508 (1972), 407 U.S. 67 (1972), 416 U.S. 396 (1974), 424 U.S. 319(1976)., 430 U.S. 817 (1977), 431 (D.C.Cir.1988), 435 U.S. 247 (1978) Mathews v. Eldridge, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), 446 (C.A.3 (Pa.), 50 (1991), 510 S.E.2d 91, 514 (11th Cir.1991), 519 U.S. 102 (1996), 541 U.S. 509 (2004)(recognizing "the fundamental right, 627 So.2d 1298 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., 682 F.2d 443, 760 F.2d 1107 (11 th Cir. 1985), 798 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1996), 834 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1987)., 851 F.2d 427, 878 F.2d 351, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir.) ; Roscoe v. Hansen, 936 F.2d 512, 95; 235 Ga.App. 551 (Ga. App., 985 F.2d 32 (C.A.1 (R.I.), 994 F.2d 1027 (C.A.3 (Virgin Islands) 1992), Add new tag, adequate alternative remedy, and Stanley Marcus, Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, Appellate Review, bad faith, BE&K Construction CO. v. National Labor Relations B, beyond the scope of appeal, binding precedents, Bounds v. Smith, Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, Brow v. Farrelly, California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, Camp v. Oliver, Carey v.Piphus, Case No. 01-15754, Case No. 01-13664, Case No. 01-16218, Case No. 02-11476-A, Case No. 02-14646, Case No. 04-11894, Case No. 05-10623-I, Chambers v.Nasco, Charles R. Wilson, Cofield v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm., Cok v. Family Court of Rhode Island, Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., De Long v. Hennessey, dishonesty, DOUGLAS BAUM v. BLUE MOON VENTURES, Eleventh Circuit, filing injunction, Frank M. Hull, Fuentes v. Shevin, Gonzales v. Feiner, Guinness world record, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners, Holton v. Oral Surg. Sing Sing Corr., IFP, in forma pauperis, In re, In Re Head, In re Powell, INC., Inc. 501U.S. 32, inherent power, Joel F. Dubina, Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, Jr., Judge Frank Hull, Judges R. Lanier Anderson, judicial independence, jurisdictional, Lack of Jurisdiction, Lau v. Meddaugh, Lawsuits of Carter, LLC, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., mandamus, mandamus petition, Martin v. Circuit Court, MLE Realty Assocs. v. Handler, Moates v. Barkley, MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., non-accountability, notice of appeal, Oliver, Owen v. City Of Independence, petition for writ of prohibition, pre-filing injunction of September 20, pre-fling injunction, Procup v. Strickland, Rehearing Denied, Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., Rosemary Barkett, scope of appeal, Sires v. Fair, Stanley F. Birch, sua sponte, Supreme Court, Susan H. Black, teflon don, Tennessee v. Lane, Tripati v. Beaman, Tucker v. Drew, U.S. Court of Appeal, U.S. District Judge Donald L. Graham, U.S. v. Powerstein, United States v. Bailey, vacatur, vexatious litigant injunction, Walker v. City Of Birmingham, Weaver v. Leon County Sch. Bd., Wiliams v. Cambridge Integrated Servs. Group
Posted in Appeal, Constitutional Law, Constitutional Rights, Contempt For Rule of Law, Disdain For Clearly Established Law, Due Process, Eleventh Circuit, first amendment, Judge Donald L. Graham, nonpublication, Right of Access To The Courts, Unpublished, Void Orders | 52 Comments »

Chief Circuit Judge J.L. Edmondson Uses Perfect Scam of Negative Definition To Defeat Complaints of Misconduct Under the Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act

June 8, 2008

Justice Turned On Its Head

Judge Donald L. Graham, The “Teflon Don”

Purpose of this Post

This entire blog or website, mcneilmason.wordpress.com, is dedicated to illustrating the extreme measures that judges at the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal have deployed to keep from disciplining U.S. District Judge Donald L. Graham, “Teflon Don”, for abusive behavior and misconduct. The overall scheme of all methods (direct appeal, mandamus, lawsuit, misconduct complaints) of disciplining federal judges have been undermined and defeated by Judge Graham’s cohorts at the Eleventh Circuit, see http://mmason.freeshell.org/methods.htm. States with have removed judges from office for the conduct that is listed in this post and elsewhere. This post will examine the perfect scam that Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson has used to defeat claims of judicial misconduct under the Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act, 28 U.S.C. § 351, et.seq. The perfect scam is a “negative definition” of judicial misconduct. A negative definition is a “definition which states what a thing is NOT rather than what it is.” http://academic.csuohio.edu/polen/LC9_Help/2/25negative.htm. Judge Edmondson does not define misconduct he simply disagrees with every act that alleges misconduct in the complaint is judicial misconduct. Consequently, a negative definition is used to define judicial misconduct out of existence. Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson’s definition, or lack thereof, would suggest that federal judges are held to a lower standard than state court judges. Congress does not help as it chosen not to identify specific acts that it considers to be judicial misconduct for it has abrogated this responsibility and left it up to judges like Judge Edmondson to decide. Section 352 states:

(b) Action by Chief Judge Following Review.— After expeditiously reviewing a complaint under subsection (a), the chief judge, by written order stating his or her reasons, may—
(1) dismiss the complaint—
(A) if the chief judge finds the complaint to be—
(i) not in conformity with section 351 (a);
(ii) directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling; or
(iii) frivolous, lacking sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred, or containing allegations which are incapable of being established through investigation; or

It is a well known fact that Chief Judges summarily dismiss complaints of misconduct at a rate greater than 90 per cent. This is part of the reason why Justice Stephen Breyer was selected by the then Chief Justice Rehnquist to do a study of the problem. At the urging of Congressman James Sensenbrenner, former Chairman, U.S. House Judiciary Committee, in 2004, a committee was formed (The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act Study Committee) by Chief Judge Rehnquist to study the problem of federal judicial discipline. Judge Edmondson is of the apparent belief that legal error and judicial misconduct are mutually exclusive. As a consequence of this narrow view, Judge Graham can put on his robe and do anything he damn well pleases because “legal error” is not judicial misconduct.

Other Tactics Used by Judge Edmondson

The use of the negative definition tactic is fatal enough by itself to demolish almost all complaints of judicial misconduct. However, Judge Edmondson has used at least three other tactics that augment the negative definition tactic. Judge Edmondson has used:

Mischaracterization. Judge Edmondson characterizes your allegations of misconduct and abuse in such a manner that they fit easily within the categories for summary dismissal. For an example, see Complaint No. 05-0011.
Omission. Judge Edmondson omits specific allegations of misconduct and abuse from his summary dismissals. For example, in complaint No. 01-0054, Judge Edmondson states: “The allegations of the Complaint are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling” and/or ‘Action on the complaint is no longer necessary because of intervening events, and therefore moot”. Consequently, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A) and (3)(B) and Addendum Three Rule 4 (a)(2), this Complaint is DISMISSED.”
Fails to test allegations of misconduct for veracity. Judge Edmondson does not test allegations of misconduct and abuse for veracity.
Failure to Investigate. Judge Edmondson does not investigate allegations of misconduct and abuse. Judge Edmondson does not ask the complainant for more information to support a charge, he simply states that the charge lacks factual support.

Specific examples of the above are set forth below in the “Not Judicial Misconduct” heading. When told of these allegations, Judge Graham’s Chief Judge, S.D. Fla., Federico Moreno offered the following tepid “endorsement”:

I am in receipt of your letter written to me as a Chief Judge of the Southern District of Florida about actions by Judge Donald Graham. In that letter, you also complained about the Chief Circuit Judge J.L. Edmondson. As you can understand one district judge cannot review the actions of another district judge. This rule applies to the Chief Judge of the District as well. It is before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta that any complaint as to a ruling made by a District Judge can be made, I assure you that any decision rendered by Judge Graham was made in good faith upon what he perceived to be the law. Judge Graham has an impeccable reputation. However, if you feel that a judge has erred, the appellate judges in Atlanta are the ones who can decide what to do about it. Thank you for writing.

See Letter dated April 4, 2008.

Judicial Misconduct Complaints

The following complaints have been lodged against Teflon Don.

Not Judicial Misconduct

Judge Edmondson has expressly stated that each of the following documented acts of misconduct are not misconduct under the Act.

Lying and Intentionally misrepresenting the law.
Refusing to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction during the entire pendency of the lawsuit from November 1999 to June 20, 2001 or about 19 months.
Judge Graham falsely completed a Civil Justice Reform Act Report, “CJRA” to conceal the fact that he had a motion for a preliminary injunction pending for more than 17 months.
Usurping authority by allowing a Magistrate, Frank Lynch Jr., to issue preliminary injunctions two times.
Usurping authority by allowing a Magistrate to dictate to a non-lawyer that he must seek the permission of private attorneys in order to speak with a local government.
Usurping authority by allowing a Magistrate to set restrictions on how Florida Public Records are to be accessed.
Allowing scores of motions to go undecided for months.
Intentionally misstating material facts in order to render a pre-filing injunction.
Disrespecting several well-established Supreme Court decisions proscribing certain acts of Judges.
Judge Graham has repeatedly and improperly denied access to the courts by arbitrarily denying in forma pauperis, “IFP”, petitions 18 separate times.
Judge Graham has been involved in possible criminal behavior by issuing a void sua sponte pre-filing injunction which ultimately formed the basis of a criminal contempt complaint and conviction.
Judge Graham used the criminal contempt process to force the withdrawal of a lawsuit.
Judge Graham awarded a massive $200,000 in attorney’s fees to Highlands County against an indigent plaintiff, Marcellus Mason, not on the quality of the underlying lawsuit, but based upon Judge Graham’s speculation about Mason’s motive.
Judge Graham attempted to circumvent the appellate process by using intimidation.

These allegations and others fully documented at: (1)http://mmason.freeshell.org/CoreAllegations.htm; or (2)Documented Acts of Misconduct by U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham. As of this date, the Judges at the Eleventh Circuit have allowed Teflon Don to escape rebuke and condemnation as Judge Graham has not been punished in any way for these acts. For example, many of these allegations were mentioned in a direct appeal and simply ignored by the appellate panel, see “Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664: The Appeal From Hell“. Petitions for mandamus met with a similar fate, see for example, Case No. 01-15754, “Eleventh Circuit Disses The U.S. Supreme Court Chooses To Protect Judge Graham“. Judge Graham’s behavior easily fits within positively defined definitions of judicial misconduct.

JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED

Judicial Misconduct has been defined by Jeffrey M. Shaman, DePaul University Law, Steven Lubet, Professor, Northwestern University Law, James J. Alfini President and Dean, South Texas College of Law, U.S. Judge Alex Kozinski, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in part as:

Judicial action taken without any arguable legal basis —and without giving notice and an opportunity to be heard to the party adversely affected—is far worse than simple error or abuse of discretion; it’s an abuse of judicial power that is “prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.” See 28 U.S.C. § 351(a); Shaman, Lubet & Alfini, supra, § 2.02, at 37 (“Serious legal error is more likely to amount to misconduct than a minor mistake.

See Opinion online at: http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/coa/newopinions.nsf/
F822E1DE5540855A8825708B0081F154/$file/0389037o.pdf?openelement .

“[A] judge is guilty of “oppression in office” when that judge intentionally commits acts which he or she knows, or should know, are obviously and seriously wrong under the circumstances and amount to an excessive use of judicial authority.” State v. Colclazier, 2002 OK JUD 1, 106 P.3d 138.

“Where honesty or integrity are at issue, a single action can result in a finding of judicial misconduct.” In re District Judge Ronald F. Kilburn, Case No. 90-478, (Vermont Supreme Court 1991)(citing In re Hill, 152 Vt. 548, 572-75, 568 A.2d 361, 373-75 (1989)). See http://dol.state.vt.us/SUPCT/157/op90-478.txt.

“Canon 3A(5) is violated where there is a pattern of unreasonable delay or where a particular instance is so lacking in legitimate justification that it is willful. See Matter of Long, 244 Kan. 719, 724, 772 P.2d 814, 818 (1989) (Canon 3A(5) violated where delay is “significant, extensive, and unjustified”); Sommerville, 364 S.E.2d at 23 n.3 (sanctions appropriate under Canon 3A(5) where there is a pattern of delay resulting from either willful neglect of, or manifest inability to effectively perform, judicial duties); Matter of Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 97 n.2, 494 A.2d 1014, 1016 n.2 (1985) (delay can violate Canon 3A(5) if “willful” or “typical of the judge’s work”);” See URL:http://www.libraries.vermont.gov/SUPCT/157/op90-478.txt.

“Legal error and judicial misconduct are not mutually exclusive.” In Re Feinberg, 5 NY3d 206,New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct.

The University of New Mexico, Institute of Public Law, Judicial Education Center, has put together a Judicial Ethics Handbook which defines judicial misconduct.

If Judge Edmondson had an affirmative definition like the ones described above, then Judge Graham would have to disciplined. If the states are able to cite and list specific examples of judicial misconduct, then there is no reason why the federal judiciary can not do the same. To simply say, no that is not misconduct as Judge Edmondson does reflexively, is not enough.

Pending Judicial Misconduct Complaints

It has been said that the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, has become quite serious in investigating federal judges for misconduct. According to law.com, in March of this year, the Judicial Conference adopted the first-ever binding nationwide procedures for handling complaints of judicial misconduct. As a result of this, Mason submitted to complaints to both the Judicial Conference and Judge Edmondson again.

Tags:$200, 000, 100 N.J. 92, 152 Vt. 548, 28 U.S.C. § 351, 568 A.2d 361, abusive behavior, appellate process, Canon 3A(5), Chief Judge Rehnquist, Civil Justice Reform Act Report, CJRA, complainant, Congressman James Sensenbrenner, criminal behavior, criminal contempt, DePaul University Law, direct appeal, directly related to the merits of a decision or procedu, disciplining, Eleventh Circuit, extreme measures, Failure to Investigate, florida public records, Frank Lynch Jr., Honesty, IFP, in forma pauperis, In re Hill, integrity, intentionally misrepresenting the law, Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judge Federico Moreno, judicial duties, Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act, Justice Stephen Breyer, lawsuit, Legal error, Lying, Magistrate, mandamus, Matter of Alvino, methods, Mischaracterization, misconduct, misconduct complaints, misstating material facts, negative definition, Not Judicial Misconduct, notice and an opportunity to be heard, omission, pattern of delay, perfect scam, pre-filing injunction, preliminary injunction, scam, scheme, speculation, sua sponte, summarily dismiss, tactics, teflon don, The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act Study Committee, U.S. Court of Appeal, U.S. District Judge Donald L. Graham, undermined, Usurping authority, veracity, Willful, willful neglect
Posted in Eleventh Circuit, Judge Donald L. Graham, Judicial Misconduct, U.S. Court of Appeal, Unpublished | 10 Comments »

Eleventh Circuit Disses The U.S. Supreme Court Chooses To Protect Judge Graham

April 28, 2008

Justice Turned On Its Head

Judge Donald L. Graham, The “Teflon Don”

Point of This Post

The U.S. Supreme Court once said: “But unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.” Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982). This post is a yet another perfect example of how the “unpublished” Opinion is used to defy the authority of the United States Supreme Court. What is clear from this post is that if the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court Of Appeal, does not like the facts or the law involved in a case, it will simply make a terse one sentence “opinion” ignoring both the facts and the law. “The “petition for writ of mandamus and petition for writ of prohibition” is DENIED.” See “Opinion“, Case No. 01-15754. In this matter, Case No. 01-15754, the Eleventh Circuit declined to honor a petition for mandamus as a notice of appeal and perform meaningful appellate review as required by the U.S. Supreme Court. The petition attacks a sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction that was rendered on September 20, 2001 and excoriates Judge Graham for his misconduct and mismanagement. It is no wonder that Judge Graham feels that he is above the law and that he is the “Teflon Don”.

In addition, on a parallel track, a direct appeal, Case No. 01-13664, is already pending when Judge Graham renders the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001. The handling of this matter yields even more dishonest and evasive measures.

The Eleventh Circuit struck Mason’s appellate brief for arguing against the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001 because they claimed it was “beyond the scope of appeal”. However, when the Eleventh Circuit rendered its opinion affirming Judge Graham it then used the same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction to affirm Judge Graham. See full story of this despicable act at this site, post entitled, “Putrid Dishonesty:Beyond the Scope of Appeal“
The Eleventh Circuit refused to test the allegations of misconduct leveled at Judge Graham for veracity, even though admittedly fully briefed, it declines to review the issue of whether or not Judge Graham abused his discretion by failing to disqualify. See full story, this site, post entitled, “Are Allegations of Misconduct Reviewable on Appeal?“

The Eleventh Circuit had to make a choice. It could save Judge Graham from his record, or it could follow binding precedent as set forth by the United States Supreme Court. It chose to save Judge Graham from the consequences of his own misbehavior and hubris. Is the Eleventh Circuit free to ignore the edicts of the United States Supreme Court?

A US Circuit Judge On the Potential Dangers of Unpublished Opinions

“If, for example, a precedent is cited, and the other side then offers a distinction, and the judges on the panel cannot think of a good answer to the distinction, but nevertheless, for some extraneous reason, wish to reject it, they can easily do so through the device of an abbreviated, unpublished opinion, and no one will ever be the wiser. (I don’t say that judges are actually doing this–only that the temptation exists.) Or if, after hearing argument, a judge in conference thinks that a certain decision should be reached, but also believes that the decision is hard to justify under the law, he or she can achieve the result, assuming agreement by the other members of the panel, by deciding the case in an unpublished opinion and sweeping the difficulties under the rug. Again, I’m not saying that this has ever occurred in any particular case, but a system that encourages this sort of behavior, or is at least open to it, has to be subject to question in any world in which judges are human beings.” 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 219 (1999). UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS: A COMMENT, Richard S. Arnold, Copyright © 1999 University of Arkansas – Little Rock School of Law ; Richard S. Arnold

United States Supreme Court

“A document intended to serve as an appellate brief may qualify as the notice of appeal required by Rule 3. So long as such a document is filed within the time allowed by Rule 4 for a notice of appeal and satisfies Rule 3(c)’s requirements as to the content of such a notice, it may be treated as the “functional equivalent” of the formal notice demanded by Rule 3.” SMITH v. BARRY ET AL. 502 U.S. 244 (1992) (Syllabus). See also Eleventh Circuit’s Finch v. Vernon, 845 F. 2d 256, 259-260 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Rogers, 788 F.2d 1472, 1475 (11th Cir.1986) (notice of appeal requirement is satisfied by any statement clearly evincing the party’s intent to appeal); Yates v. Mobile County Personnel Board, 658 F.2d 298, 299 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981) (“A petition for mandamus filed in this court, however, may also satisfy the notice of appeal requirement, especially when the appellant is proceeding pro se … and is thus generally ignorant of procedural rules.”).”).

The Eleventh Circuit received a mandamus petition that was docketed as being received on October 2, 2001. See Receipt. This is a 25 page petition plus exhibits. Microsoft Word Format, html format, and pdf format. According to the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit’s own binding precedents, this mandamus petition should have been treated as a notice of appeal.

“If a document filed within the time specified by Rule 4 gives the notice required by Rule 3, it is effective as a notice of appeal.“); Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1279-80 (11th Cir.2001)…To perform its function a notice of appeal must specify the parties taking the appeal, designate the judgment or order being appealed, and name the court to which the appeal is being taken. Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1). That is all.” Main Drug, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 475 F.3d 1228 (11^th Cir. 2007).

The Defendant, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners, and U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham also received a copy of the mandamus petiton. Judge Graham did not file a brief in opposition to the petition. The Defendant did not file a responsive brief to the petition. The Eleventh Circuit did not require anyone to respond the petition.

Basis of Mandamus or Appeal

On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham rendered a pre-filing injunction, sua sponte, against Marcellus Mason. See Document No. 878. This type of order is also referred to as “Vexatious Litigant injunction“, “pre-screening injunction”, and “leave to file injunction”. This order specifically states: “THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte.” See Document No. 878, pg. 3. There is a string of U.S. appellate courts and state courts, including Florida and Georgia that have declared sua sponte issued pre-filing injunctions issued without notice and opportunity to respond to be invalid. See Case Law On Pre-Filing Injunctions Section, Judge Graham Disagrees With The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th, 10th, 11th, And DC Circuit Courts Of Appeal.

A mandamus petition was docketed as being received on October 2, 2001 by the Eleventh Circuit. See Receipt. This petition attacks the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001. This petition also excoriates Judge Graham and takes him to task for the following:

Graham has usurped the power of law enforcement.
Graham has usurped the power of the “Legislature.”
Graham improperly interjected himself into matters under the Florida Public Records Act.
Grant has allowed significant and material pretrial motions to languish in the Court without making a decision. Petitioner will show that Graham has allowed motions and appeals to go for months without being addressed. Petitioner will show that Graham has granted summary judgments without addressing filings by this Petitioner, which attacks the summary judgment. Graham has repeated refused to rule on the Petitioner’s Motions For Summary Judgment.
Graham has had Petitioner’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction to languish in his Court and die on the vine without a ruling on the merits, despite the fact that the motion has been pending since November 24, 1999.
Graham has failed to conduct proper “de novo” reviews when required. Graham has effectively undermined the will of Congress by allowing a Magistrate Judge to decide dispositive matters without the express authorization of all the parties. The Magistrate Judge has been granted “de facto” dispositive authority by Graham.
Graham has been dishonest in claiming that matters have been litigated when they have not been litigated.
On numerous occasions, Graham has exercised judicial authority without explaining the law and the facts that underlie his decisions. In this respect Graham has made a host of arbitrary and capricious decisions.
Graham has been guilty of gross mismanagement and malfeasance in every case to which this Petitioner has been a party to.

See Petition For Mandamus, pgs. 3,8-12,18-23.

Is The Eleventh Circuit An Advocate for Judge Graham?

In reply to the 25 page petition on December 5, 2001, the Eleventh Circuit rendered the following “Opinion”:

“The “petition for writ of mandamus and petition for writ of prohibition” is DENIED.” See “Opinion“, Case No. 01-15754.

Mason filed a motion for clarification seeking to know the basis upon which the decision was made or what the opinion stood for, however the Eleventh Circuit declined to discuss the matter.

Rehearing Denied

On January 25, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit denied a motion for clarification:

Petitioner’s “motion for reconsideration and clarification” of this Court’s December 5, 2001, Order, is DENIED as Petitioner has offered no reason sufficient to warrant either reconsideration or clarification of this Court’s Order.

Rehearing Denied

Personal Responsibility and Integrity of the Judges

On February 6, 2004, Judge Stanley Marcus, Judge Rosemary Barkett, and Judge Susan Black were sent a letter via U.S. certified mail informing them of the legal atrocities in this matter. See Letter. However, all declined to answer or take the appropriate legal action as required by the United States Supreme Court.

Tags:299 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981), appellate brief, arbitrary and capricious, beyond the scope of appeal, direct appeal, Eleventh Circuit, Finch v. Vernon 845 F. 2d 256 259-260 (11th Cir. 1988), Hutto v. Davis 454 U.S. 370 (1982), Judge Rosemary Barkett, Judge Stanley Marcus, Judge Susan Black, Languish, malfeasance, mandamus, meaningful appellate review, merits, Mismanagement, Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION, motion for reconsideration and clarification, motion for rehearing, notice of appeal, petition, Petitioner, petiton for mandamus, pre-filing injunction, pre-screening, Rule 3 Fed.R.App.P., Rule 4 Fed.R.App.P., SMITH v. BARRY ET AL. 502 U.S. 244 (1992), sua sponte, sua sponte pre-filing injunction, substitute, United States v. Rogers 788 F.2d 1472 1475 (11th Cir.19, Unpublished, usurped, Vexatious Litigant, writ of mandamus, writ of prohibition, Yates v. Mobile County Personnel Board 658 F.2d 298
Posted in Unpublished | 13 Comments »

Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson Aggressively Defends Judge Donald L. Graham

April 17, 2008

Judge Donald L. Graham

Foreword

There’s an old Negro spiritual called “May the Work I’ve Done Speak for Me”. In this same spirit, this author allows the work of Chief Circuit Judge J.L. Edmondson and his cohorts to speak for them. Unlike, Judge Graham and his enablers, their work will not be characterized or mis-characterized it will be produced in full and publicly available for the reading public to make their own assessments. The record fully supports the idea that Judge Edmondson and his colleagues at the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals have defined the concept of “judicial misconduct” out of existence. Moreover, the record here will reveal that Judge Edmondson and his colleagues will not mention the allegations of misconduct raised against Judge Graham, much less test them for veracity.

What To Focus On

The allegations of misconduct are not denied.
The allegations of misconduct are rarely mentioned.
The Allegations of misconduct were ignored in the appellate process
- Usurping Legal Authority
- Refusing to Rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction
- Allowing Scores of Motion to Languish
- Judge attempted to arrogate his own authority by ordering the clerk to return notices of appeals without filing them.
  - intentionally lying and misrepresenting the law;
  - refusing to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction for more than 15 months;
  - allowing scores of motions to go undecided;
  - and usurping legal authority.
  - The complaint alleges (Core Allegations):
  - intentionally lying and misrepresenting the law;
  - refusing to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction for more than 15 months;
  - allowing scores of motions to go undecided;
  - and usurping legal authority.

When Does Judge Graham become Accountable?

Judge Edmondson’s Attack on the Complainant

On May 2, 2005, Circuit Judge J.L. Edmondson, Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal stated:

Of the eight complaints not specifically naming Judge Graham as the complained–of judge, five name judges of this Court who served on panels reviewing Mr. Mason’s appeals — panels that affirmed decisions and rulings by Judge Graham. None of Mr. Mason’s judicial complaints have prevailed. All of the complaints that have been resolved to date have been dismissed for some or all of the following reasons: the complaints were (1) plainly untrue; (2) frivolous; (3) successive; (4) conclusively refuted by objective evidence; (5) lacking in factual foundation; (5) lacking in evidence sufficient to raise an inference that misconduct had occurred; or (6) directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling…Eight of Mr. Mason’s twenty-one judicial complaints are still pending before this Court: Complaint numbers 05-0011, 05-0012, 05-0013, 05-0020, 05-0021, 05- 0022, 05-0023, and 05-0036. Six of those complaints name Judge Graham while the other two name judges of this Court who served on panels that affirmed decisions or rulings issued by Judge Graham. Four of the complaints are, on their face, successive. Accordingly, determination of those eight complaints will be held in abeyance pending the resolution of this Show Cause Order

See Show Cause Order.

The Perfect Scam

IMPORTANT BACKGROUND AND CONCURRENT FACTS

In order to fully understand the lengths that Judge Edmondson and his cohorts at the Eleventh Circuit are willing to go through to conceal the acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance committed by Judge Donald L. Graham, one must read the opinions in the direct appeal, Case
No. 01-13664 and mandamus petition, Case No. 01-15754 (“The “petition for writ of mandamus and petition for writ of prohibition” is DENIED.“)in conjunction with the complaints listed below. The Eleventh Circuit does not deny the allegations it simply ignores them. In the direct appeal, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledges that it was briefed on the issue that Judge Graham should have disqualified because of the alleged misconduct, however, it refuses to discuss this issue on appeal (“Mason also raises issues that relate to non-sanction matters, … the denial of his motions to disqualify the district court and magistrate judges,“). Similarly, it refuses to discuss this issue in mandamus petition.

The Eleventh Circuit and Judge Edmondson employed a perfect strategy to conceal these allegations of misconduct. The direct appeal and mandamus orders are non-published. Neither of these opinions have ever been available in the Court’s database or released. Couple this fact, with the fact that the Judicial Misconduct Complaints are kept confidential no one would ever know save this website.

It is noteworthy and quite revealing that upon reading the complaints and Judge Edmondson’s replies that he does not deny, because he can not, any of the allegations set forth in any of the complaints below.

The point of the foregoing is that Judge Edmondson and his cohorts knew full well that when these complaints were lodged that the Eleventh Circuit had already refused to address these allegations in the appellate process. Consequently, there is no remedy for these acts of misconduct and abuse.

Complaint #01-0054

This complaint raised the following allegations:

Complaint No. 01-0054. On November 7, 2001, former Chief Judge R. Lanier Anderson, without denying the truth of the allegations, stated:

Marcellus M. Mason. Jr. filed this complaint against United States District Judge Donald L. Graham, pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) and Addendum Three to the Rules of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit. The allegations of the Complaint are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling” and/or ‘Action on the complaint is no longer necessary because of intervening events, and intervening events”. Consequently, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A) and (3)(B) and Addendum Three Rule 4 (a)(2), this Complaint is DISMISSED.

On March 5, 2002, the Judicial Council declined to do a review. See Order.

Case No. 01-0068

Complaint No. 01-0068

Complaint filed on November 27, 2001

Tags:05- 0022, 05-0011, 05-0012, 05-0013, 05-0020, 05-0021, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), 28 U .S .C. § 352(b)(1)(ii), 28 U .S.C. § 352 (b)(I)(ii), 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A), abeyance, Accountable, Addendum Three Rule 4 (a)(2), affirmed, Appellate Attorney, AUSA, Case No. 01-15754, Case No. 01-13664, characterized, Circuit Judge J.L. Edmondson, Civil Justice Reform Act Report, CJRA, conceal, criminal contempt, deliberately stated misleading facts, dictators, directly related to the merits of a decision or procedu, DISMISSED, disqualified, events, factual foundation, Fed.R.Civ.P., Fifth Amendment, Frank Smith, frivolous, Hitler, IFP, illegal injunction, in forma pauperis, infamous autocrats, inherent authority, intervening events, ircumventing the appellate process, issue on appeal, Judicial Misconduct, lacking in evidence, Languish, Lynn Waxman, malfeasance, mandamus, Maria Sorolis, mis-characterized, misfeasance, nonfeasance, outright lied, pefect scam, petition, pre-filing screening, preliminary injunction, refuted by objective evidence, Robert Waters, Rule 60(b), Rule 7.1.B.3, rule of law, Sadam Hussein, Show Cause, Stalin, Status/Motion Hearing, strategy, successive, Title 28 U.S.C. § 372(c), U.S. Probation, U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., Unpublished, Usurping legal authority, writ of prohibition
Posted in Criminal Acts, Eleventh Circuit, Judicial Misconduct, Junk and Absurd Law, Uncategorized | 1 Comment »

Judicial Independence Equals Nonaccountability?

April 8, 2008

Justice Turned On Its Head

Judge Donald L. Graham, “Teflon Don”

What the Proponents Of “Judicial Independence” Say

The Justice at Stake Campaign has asserted the following:

Judicial independence means that judges are free to decide cases fairly and impartially, relying only on the facts and the law. It means that judges are protected from political pressure, legislative pressure, special interest pressure, media pressure, public pressure, financial pressure, or even personal pressure.

No one expects judges to be perfect, or please everyone. That’s why there are mechanisms to hold judges accountable. Rulings can be appealed up to the Supreme Court. Laws can be changed. Wrongdoing and ethical violations can be punished. In most states, judges must stand for re-election.

According to the Justice at Stake Campaign, This position is supported by the American Bar Association, American Judicature Society, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, and a host of others. Without reading the rest of this post, one need only go to mmason.freeshell.org/methods.htm, to find out why “mechanisms to hold judges accountable” do not work with respect to federal judges. Federal Judges are above the law and can not be punished except under the most extreme circumstances and then only with public scrutiny.

You stop here and read the post on this blog, “Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson Aggressively Defends Judge Donald L. Graham” to see why “Judicial Independence” is a deeply flawed concept.

https://mcneilmason.wordpress.com/2008/04/17/chief-judge-jl-edmondson-aggressively-defends-judge-donald-l-graham

Preparatory Work

This is a fact oriented site backed up with actual real world documents and not some academic exercise. This site and similar ones takes the case of U.S. Judge Donald L. Graham and documents acts of judicial misconduct. It also documents the extreme measures that other judges will take to shield fellow judges from public scrutiny and hence accountability to the American public. The American public can not scrutinize what it does not know exists in the first instance. This author recommends that you first read the Allegations of Misconduct leveled at Judge Graham. Satisfy yourself that they are legitimate and return to this page. These allegations include, but are not limited to the following:

Committing a criminal act by abuse of the criminal contempt procedure. Judge Graham took a clearly invalid sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction or vexatious litigant injunction and made it the basis of a criminal contempt complaint and conviction. Judge Graham framed an innocent man by concocting a crime out of “whole cloth”. See Framed.
Lying and intentionally misrepresenting law.
Lying and intentionally misrepresenting material facts.
Refusing to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction that had been pending for more
than 17 months.
Allowing scores of motions and filings to languish without being decided.
Usurping legal authority. Allowing a Magistrate to issue an injunction prohibiting direct communication with the Highlands County Government.
Additionally, prohibiting Marcellus Mason from making public
records request under Florida Law directly to Highlands County.
Routinely violating clearly established law and the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court by issuing pre-filing injunctions.
Ignoring the U.S. Supreme Court denying access to the courts by refusing to state any reason for denying IFP applications.

Judicial Independence Equals Unaccountability

In the case of federal judges, it is the opinion of this author that Judicial Independence Equals Unaccountability. There are several methods of disciplining rogue judges that include:

Appellate Review. This could be Direct Appeal, Mandamus, or some other method of petitioning an appellate court for relief.

Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act. The Judicial Improvements Act of 2002 replaced 28 U.S.C. § 372(c), which formerly governed complaints of judicial misconduct or disability, with 28 U.S.C. § 351, et seq., effective November 2, 2002. This is a complaint procedure that is suppose to handle misconduct of a federal judge by filing a complaint with the Chief Judge and Judicial Council, composed of federal judges.

Lawsuit. A lawsuit can be filed against the offending judge, the lawsuit needs to defeat a virtually insurmountable concept called “absolute immunity” which means that a judge could intentionally jail someone and still not be punished. Judges get to decide who have absolute immunity” or “judicial immunity” and who doesn’t.

Impeachment. Congress has the right to remove any federal judge, however this is a massive undertaking for the Congress and one that is rarely used. See Section below on Impeachment.

Except for impeachment, the other three methods are controlled by Judges and most often without public scrutiny. If federal judges are determined to undermine each of these methods, they can do so quite easily and appear to be acting within the law. This is easily done with a process or tactic that this author calls “herding”. Herding being the shepherd or the cowboy leads the sheep or cows to the desired destination or outcome. In the sense for which this author uses the term “herding”, judges leads you to the desire outcome by choosing the method and controlling both the facts and their publication. Specifically, complaints under the Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act are summarily dismissed because the allegations are “directly related to the merits”. See Methods Page and Section 351 Page. This suggests that your allegations of misconduct, if true, can be addressed through the appellate process. Chief Judge J. L. Edmondson, Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal, has become very adept at this tactic and has defined judicial misconduct out of existence. Not only has he defined judicial misconduct out of existence he does not burden himself to list the allegations of misconduct or test them for veracity. Secondly, if you choose to sue the Judge, then your complaint will be summarily dismissed because the miscreant judge has “absolute immunity” even if your allegations of misconduct are true. See Graham’s Lawsuit. The appeals court need not even mention what the judge was being sued for in the first place. A judge could maliciously and knowingly improperly jail some one and still not be personally liable. The judges will say that the appellate process is your answer. Save impeachment, you now have only have the appellate process to address allegations of misconduct. The appeals court and in this case, the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals, can and does render an unpublished opinion that simply ignores your allegations of misconduct or even outright lie. See Appellate Review. On Appeal the Eleventh Circuit picks the impertinent “facts” and chooses to publish or not publish. A graphical view of the overall process as to how complaints of misconduct against Judge Graham were handled can be found at : mmason.freeshell.org/methods.htm#herding_complaints_section or mmason.freeshell.org/mockery.jpg. Specifically, the appellate process with Judge Graham has been undermined with the following tactics:

Lying to Cover a Lie
Denying Access
Ignoring Issues. A truly egregious example is declining to review a Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction
Lying About Jurisdiction
Beyond the Scope of Appeal: A Despicable and Egregious Act

Impeachment Is Not An Option

Impeachment is not a likely option and virtually impossible as the process requires the attention of all the 535 members of the House and Senate. According to the Federal Judicial Center, http://air.fjc.gov/history/topics/topics_ji_bdy.html, only 13 judges have been before the Congress on impeachment charges in the entire history of the United States. Of these 13 judges, only 7 have been kicked out of office: John Pickering, West H. Humphreys, Robert W. Archbald, Halsted L. Ritter, Harry E. Claiborne, Alcee L. Hastings, and Walter L. Nixon. Judge Mark H. Delahay resigned. It is easier to impeach the President of the United States than to impeach a federal judge. For example, of the 43 presidents of the United States, two have been impeached, Bill Clinton and Andrew Johnson, or about 4 per cent. According to the Federal Judicial Center, we have had 3055 federal judges, only 13, or about 0.004 per cent have been impeached.

As a practical matter, federal judges are rarely called to answer for their performance on the job. As difficult as they are to remove, federal judges are equally difficult to demote. Article III explicitly prohibits the diminishment of a judge’s salary while in office, no matter how errant-or delinquent or unpopular-his or her decisions may be. On the whole, judges are easily the most independent constitutional officers.

On Judicial Activism, by Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain
, URL: http://open-spaces.com/article-v3n1-oscannlain.php

JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST U.S. JUDGE DONALD L. GRAHAM

Judge Graham has a host of judicial misconduct filed against him. Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson’s has dismissed most of these complaints by simply defining judicial misconduct out of existence. State court judges have been removed for less reasons than the conduct committed by Judge Graham. Read the following complaints and Judge Edmondson’s reply and form your own judgment. The following complaints have been lodged against Teflon Don, or U.S. District Judge Donald L. Graham.

Pending Judicial Misconduct Complaints

Complaint	Status
Judicial Conference	pending
Reconsideration	pending
June 25, 2008	pending
July 9, 2008	pending
July 15, 2008	pending

It has been said that the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, has become quite serious in investigating federal judges for misconduct. According to law.com,
Binding National Rules Adopted for Handling Judicial Misconduct Complaints,

in March of this year, the Judicial Conference adopted the first-ever binding nationwide procedures for handling complaints of judicial misconduct. U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham has escaped discipline for his abusive and possible criminal behavior. As a result of this, Mason submitted complaints to both the Judicial Conference and
Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson, Eleventh Circuit, US Court of Appeal, again. These complaints are governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364,”The Judicial Improvements Act of 2002” formerly “The Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act“. Previously, Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson, had been misconstruing the statute and summarily dismissing complaints of misconduct by simply regurgitating the statutory language at 28 U.S.C. § 352 which allows him dismiss complaints that are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling“. Judge Edmondson is alone in his view that legal error and judicial misconduct are mutually exclusive. For more discussion on “legal error” and judicial misconduct, see article Chief Circuit Judge J.L. Edmondson Uses Perfect Scam of Negative
Definition To Defeat Complaints of Misconduct Under the Judicial
Misconduct and Disability Act . On Tuesday, June 25, 2008, a new complaint of judicial misconduct was filed against Judge Graham. Additionally, complaints of misconduct
were initiated against Judge Graham on July 9, 2008 and July 15, 2008.

JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED

Judicial action taken without any arguable legal basis and without giving notice and an opportunity to be heard to the party adversely affected is far worse than simple error or abuse of discretion; its an abuse of judicial power that is prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 351(a); Shaman, Lubet & Alfini, supra, § 2.02, at 37 (Serious legal error is more likely to amount to misconduct than a minor mistake.

See Opinion online at:

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/coa/newopinions.nsf/F822E1DE5540855A8825708B0081F154/$file/0389037o.pdf?openelement
.

“Where honesty or integrity are at issue, a single action can result in a finding of judicial misconduct.” In re Hill, 152 Vt. 548, 572-75, 568 A.2d 361,373-75 (1989);

“Canon 3A(5) is violated where there is a pattern of unreasonable delay or where a particular instance is so lacking in legitimate justification that it is willful. See Matter of Long, 244 Kan. 719, 724, 772 P.2d 814, 818 (1989) (Canon 3A(5) violated where delay is significant, extensive, and unjustified”); Sommerville, 364 S.E.2d at 23 n.3 (sanctions appropriate under Canon 3A(5) where there is a pattern of delay resulting from either willful neglect of, or manifest inability to effectively perform, judicial duties); Matter of Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 97 n.2, 494 A.2d 1014, 1016 n.2 (1985) (delay can violate Canon 3A(5) if “willful” or “typical of the judge’s work”);” See URL: http://www.libraries.vermont.gov/SUPCT/157/op90-478.txt.

Judicial Independence Equals Unaccountability

In the case of federal judges, it is the opinion of this author that Judicial Independence Equals Unaccountability. There are several methods of disciplining rogue judges that include:

Except for impeachment, the other three methods are controlled by Judges and most often without public scrutiny. If federal judges are determined to undermine each of these methods, they can do so quite easily and appear to be acting within the law. This is easily done with a process or tactic that this author calls “herding”. Herding being the shepherd or the cowboy leads the sheep or cows to the desired destination or outcome. In the sense for which this author uses the term “herding”, judges leads you to the desire outcome by choosing the method and controlling both the facts and their publication. Specifically, complaints under the Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act are summarily dismissed because the allegations are “directly related to the merits”. See Methods Page and Section 351 Page. This suggests that your allegations of misconduct, if true, can be addressed through the appellate process. Chief Judge J. L. Edmondson, Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal, has become very adept at this tactic and has defined judicial misconduct out of existence. Not only has he defined judicial misconduct out of existence he does not burden himself to list the allegations of misconduct or test them for veracity. Secondly, if you choose to sue the Judge, then your complaint will be summarily dismissed because the miscreant judge has “absolute immunity” even if your allegations of misconduct are true. See Graham’s Lawsuit. The appeals court need not even mention what the judge was being sued for in the first place. A judge could maliciously and knowingly improperly jail some one and still not be personally liable. The judges will say that the appellate process is your answer. Save impeachment, you now have only have the appellate process to address allegations of misconduct. The appeals court and in this case, the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals, can and does render an unpublished opinion that simply ignores your allegations of misconduct or even outright lie. See Appellate Review. On Appeal the Eleventh Circuit picks the impertinent “facts” and chooses to publish or not publish. A graphical view of the overall process as to how complaints of misconduct against Judge Graham were handled can be found at : mmason.freeshell.org/herding_complaints_section or mmason.freeshell.org/mockery.jpg. Specifically, the appellate process with Judge Graham has been undermined with the following tactics:

Tags:above the law, absolute immunity, American Bar Assocation, Appeal, Chief Judge, complaint, criminal act, direct appeal, dishonesty, Donald L. Graham, egregious, Eleventh Circuit, ethical, federal judges, framed, impeachment, integrity, Judicial Council.impeachment, judicial independence, Judicial Misconduct, Judicial Misconduct Act, Lying, malicious, mandamus, public scrutiny, rulings, u.s. supreme court, Vexatious Litigant, wrondoings
Posted in Contempt For Rule of Law, Eleventh Circuit, Evading Issues and Outcome, Judge Donald L. Graham, Judicial Misconduct, U.S. Court of Appeal | 2 Comments »

You Don’t have A Right to Have Your Motions Decided

March 29, 2008

This article is part of a series and an expose on just how far the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals will go to conceal the judicial misconduct and miscreant behavior of U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham. The decisions documented here by the Eleventh Circuit are characterized by extreme dishonesty and are no more than “junk law” that it would not think of publishing. This type of jurisprudence simply cannot be accepted in a free society like the United States of America.

Judge Donald L. Graham

Does a litigant have a right to his or her motion decided?

According to the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals and Judge Ed Carnes , a litigant does not have the right to have his motion decided. On April 26, 2001, Judge Ed Carnes opined:

His mandamus petition, however, is frivolous because he has failed to establish that he is entitled to mandamus relief to compel the district court to rule on his motion for preliminary injunction.

See Judge Carnes Opinion.

Factual Background

On November 24, 1999, Case No. 99-14027-CIV-Graham/Lynch, Judge Donald L. Graham was presented with a motion for a preliminary injunction. See Docket Entry No. 39. The case was ultimately closed on June 20, 2001 and Judge Graham NEVER decided the motion one way or the other. On or about March 8, 2001, Marcellus Mason filed a petition for mandamus, in forma pauperis or without paying court filing fees due to indigence, with the Eleventh Circuit to force Judge Graham to rule on the pending motion for a preliminary injunction. On April 26, 2001, Judge Ed Carnes, 17 months after the motion was submitted, as fully stated above, ruled that Mason does not have the right to have his motion decided.

The Law and the Right to Have Motions Decided

“A Court confronted by a motion authorized by the Rules must decide the motion within a reasonable time…the right of a movant to have a motion decided is so clear that it will be enforced under proper circumstances by mandamus.” US East Telecommunications v. US West Inf. Sys., 15 F.3d 261 (2nd Cir. 1994).

Published Decision Reaches a Different Result

Compare the above and Judge Graham to Judge Duross Fitzpatrick, now deceased, in Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (C.A.11 (Ga.), 1997), a published decision, where the Eleventh Circuit stated : “Failure to consider and rule on significant pretrial motions before issuing dispositive orders can be an abuse of discretion.” Wonder how Judge Duross Fitzpatrick would have felt about this disparity?

Links to Other Dishonest Tactics Used By the Eleventh Circuit

A Web Portal On Judge Donald L. Graham and the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals

Tags:Eleventh Circuit, filing fees, frivolous, IFP, in forma pauperis, Judge Donald L. Graham, Judge Duross Fitzpatrick, Judge Ed Carnes, Judicial Misconduct, junk law, jurisprudence, mandamus, miscreant, motice decided, pending motion, preliminary injunction, published decision
Posted in Eleventh Circuit, Judge Donald L. Graham, Judicial Misconduct, Junk and Absurd Law, U.S. Court of Appeal, Uncategorized | 1 Comment »

Will the Judges In the Eleventh Circuit Lie to Protect Judge Graham?

March 28, 2008

Will the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal lie to protect Judge Donald L. Graham? The answer is a resounding yes.

Judge Donald L. Graham

Lying About Appellate Review Of Judge Graham’s Disqualification The lie told by the Eleventh Circuit is really quite simple. As set forth below in Case No. 01-13664, the Eleventh Circuit declined to review the issue of whether Judge Graham should have disqualified or not due to alleged misconduct in their decision of October 16, 2002. However, sometime in early 2005, Marcellus Mason subsequently filed a petition for mandamus seeking appellate review as to whether or not Judge Graham should have disqualified due to alleged misconduct. On March 16, 2005, Case No. 05-10623, pg. 2, the Eleventh Circuit promptly lied by explicitly suggesting that they had reviewed this matter. This is dishonesty of the highest magnitude. Case No. 01-13664
In an unpublished opinion, [Case No. 01-13664] the Eleventh Circuit, Judges Stanley F. Birch, Jr., Susan H. Black, and Stanley Marcus have expressly stated that allegations of judicial misconduct are not reviewable on appeal. Theses allegations were not tested for veracity they were simply ignored. Specifically, in the opinion rendered on October 16, 2002, Judges Stanley F. Birch, Jr., Susan H. Black, and Stanley Marcus asserted:

“Mason also raises issues that relate to non-sanction matters, e.g., .. the denial of his motions to disqualify the district court and magistrate judges…”

See Opinion, page 10. This is the sum total of appellate review as to whether Judge Donald L. Graham should have been disqualified due to misconduct. There is absolutely no discussion as to whether the allegations of misconduct are true or not.

Eleventh Circuit Case No. 05-10623

On March 16, 2005, Case No. 05-10623, pg. 2, the Eleventh Circuit and Judge Rosemary Barkett asserted the following:

In this case, Mason is not entitled to the recusal of Judge Graham because final judgment has been entered in his employment discrimination case, and he raised Judge Graham’s denial of his recusal motion on appeal.

This is a classical example of how a half- truth can be a lie because it is misleading. Mason did raise the issue of Judge Graham’s failure to disqualify (Case No. 01-13664), however, as fully set forth and documented above, the Eleventh Circuit refused to review this issue or to test the veracity of the allegations of misconduct and abuse by Judge Graham which Mason had asserted in his brief.

Tags:allegations of misconduct, Appellate Review, dishonesty, Disqualification, Eleventh Circuit, final judgment, Judge Donald L. Graham, Judge Rosemary Barkett, Judge Stanley F. Birch Jr., Judge Stanley Marcus, Judge Susan H. Black, lie, magistrate judge, mandamus, misconduct, motions to disqualify, petition for mandamus, protect, U.S. Court of Appeal
Posted in Appeal, Eleventh Circuit, Evading Issues and Outcome, Judge Donald L. Graham, Judicial Misconduct, Lying, nonpublication, U.S. Court of Appeal, Unpublished | Leave a Comment »

Judge Donald L. Graham and US Attorney R. Alexander Acosta Frame Innocent Man

March 26, 2008

FRAMING AN INNOCENT PERSON AND OTHER CRIMINALITY AND MISCONDUCT

One of the most serious allegations is that Judge Donald L. Graham framed a man with the help of the U.S. Attorney. This is a quick read less than five minutes. See

http://mmason.freeshell.org/framed.htm#quick. This page documents how U.S. Judge Donald L. Graham used US Attorney R. Alexander Acosta, AUSA Theodore Cooperstein, and AUSA Robert Waters U.S. Judge Donald L. Graham to frame an innocent by concocting a criminal misdemeanor. This story is incredible in that these people took a clearly void sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction or vexatious litigant injunction and made it the basis of criminal contempt complaint. Even more incredible is that the Eleventh Circuit has absolutely refused to review this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction on multiple occasions. See http://mmason.freeshell.org/framed.htm#appellate_review

The misconduct is really a two part story consisting of Judge Graham’s misconduct and his colleagues efforts to conceal it. One of the problems I have had is not documenting these allegations, but organizing them. I have a massive amount of information on a website. mmason.freeshell.org.

I have a page called Core Allegations of Misconduct at : http://mmason.freeshell.org/CoreAllegations.htm .
This page contains links that document the following:

Judge Graham lied and intentionally misrepresented the law.
Judge Graham and his Magistrate usurped legal authority by allowing a Magistrate to issue an injunction which is prohibited under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(a) and ordering Mason not to communicate with his government, Highlands County Board of County Communications.
Judge Graham refused to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction by Marcellus Mason that had been pending for more than 17 months. As a matter of fact, the Eleventh Circuit refused to make Judge Graham ruled on the motion by denying mandamus even after the motion had been pending for about 15 months.
Judge Graham allowed scores of other important motions to simply linger without addressing them.
Judge Graham abused the criminal contempt procedure by taking a void sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction and making it the basis of a criminal contempt information.
Judge Graham used the criminal contempt process to force the withdrawal of a lawsuit.
Judge Graham awarded a massive $200,000 in attorney’s fees to Highlands County against an indigent plaintiff, Marcellus Mason, not on the quality of the underlying lawsuit, but based upon Judge Graham’s speculation about Mason’s motive.
Judge Graham has repeatedly improperly denied access to the courts by arbitrarily denying in forma pauperis, “IFP”, petitions. As a consequence, Judge Graham has necessarily arrogated his authority by denying appellate review of his lawless decisions.
Judge Graham falsely completed a Civil Justice Reform Act Report, “CJRA” in order to conceal the fact the fact that he had a motion for a preliminary injunction pending for more than 17 months.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, U.S. COURT OF APPEAL
The Eleventh Circuit has used every trick in the book to avoid scrutinizing the behavior of Judge Graham. It has been unwilling to test these allegations.
The Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal, has refused to test these allegations of misconduct for veracity, much less remedy them. This is really an incredible story of dishonesty. The methods employed by the Eleventh Circuit to circumvent legitimate appellate review are many and seem to be only limited by the Eleventh Circuit’s imagination. See mmason.freeshell.org/methods.htm.

Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit, primarily Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson, has mocked and contorted the Judicial Misconduct Act by refusing to investigate these allegations of misconduct against Judge Graham even though he knows full well that the appellate process has refused to address these allegations of misconduct. See Judicial Misconduct Home Page.

Tags:access to the courts, allegations of misconduct, Appellate Review, arbitrary, arrogate, AUSA Robert Waters, AUSA Theodore Cooperstein, Civil Justice Reform Act Report, clearly void, conceal, contempt information, Core Allegations of Misconduct, criminal misdemeanor, CRIMINALITY, framing, IFP, in forma pauperis, indigent, innocent, INNOCENT PERSON, intentionally misrepresented the law, Judge Donald L. Graham, Judge J.L. Edmondson, lied, mandamus, misconduct, pending, pre-filing, preliminary injunction, R. Alexander Acosta, sua sponte, US Attorney, usurped legal authority, veracity, Vexatious Litigant, void
Posted in Criminal Acts, Eleventh Circuit, Judge Donald L. Graham, Judicial Misconduct, Prevariaction, U.S. Court of Appeal | Leave a Comment »

Posts Tagged ‘mandamus’

Judicial Independence

Judge J. Owen Forrester and the Published Opinion

Judge Donald L. Graham and the Unpublished Opinion

Long History of Refusing to Review the Sua Sponte Issued Pre-filing Injunction

The Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction

The U.S. Supreme Court,”SCOTUS”, On the Importance of Due Process

Right of Access To Courts is Constitutionally Protected

Case Law On Pre-Filing Injunctions

US CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS HAVE ROUTINELY REJECTED “SUA SPONTE” PRE-FILING INJUNCTIONS.

Foreword

How Many Times Can a Court Refuse to Review an Order For Validity?

Judicial Independence

The Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction

Case No. 01-13664-A, Direct Appeal

Case No, 01-15754, Mandamus

Rehearing Denied

Case No. 01-16218

Case No. 02-11476-A

Case No. 02-14646, Mandamus

Case No. 04-11894, Mandamus

Case No. 05-10623-I, Mandamus

The U.S. Supreme Court,”SCOTUS”, On the Importance of Due Process

Right of Access To Courts is Constitutionally Protected

Case Law On Pre-Filing Injunctions

US CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS HAVE ROUTINELY REJECTED “SUA SPONTE” PRE-FILING INJUNCTIONS.

Pre-filing Restrictions

Purpose of this Post

Other Tactics Used by Judge Edmondson

Not Judicial Misconduct

JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED

Pending Judicial Misconduct Complaints

Point of This Post

A US Circuit Judge On the Potential Dangers of Unpublished Opinions

United States Supreme Court

Basis of Mandamus or Appeal

Is The Eleventh Circuit An Advocate for Judge Graham?

Rehearing Denied

Personal Responsibility and Integrity of the Judges

Foreword

What To Focus On

INTERVENING MANDAMUS

COMPLAINTS FILED IN 2005

When Does Judge Graham become Accountable?

Judge Edmondson’s Attack on the Complainant

The Perfect Scam

Case No. 01-0068

What the Proponents Of “Judicial Independence” Say

Preparatory Work

Judicial Independence Equals Unaccountability

Impeachment Is Not An Option

JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST U.S. JUDGE DONALD L. GRAHAM

JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED

Judicial Independence Equals Unaccountability

Does a litigant have a right to his or her motion decided?

Factual Background

The Law and the Right to Have Motions Decided

Published Decision Reaches a Different Result

Links to Other Dishonest Tactics Used By the Eleventh Circuit

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