Posts Tagged ‘Case No. 01-15754’

Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals, Sets Guiness World Record For Refusing to Review Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction

June 12, 2008

Justice Turned On Its Head

Judge Donald L. GrahamJudge Donald L. Graham, “Teflon Don”

Foreword

There’s an old Negro spiritual called “May the Work I’ve Done Speak for Me”. In this same spirit, this author allows the work of the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal and Judge Graham’s cohorts to speak for them. Unlike, Judge Graham, the Eleventh Circuit and his enablers apparent zeal and affinity for dishonesty, mis-characterization, omission, their work will not be characterized or mis-characterized it will be produced in full and publicly available for the reading public to make their own assessments. The record fully supports the idea that the Eleventh Circuit and its Judges and staff attorneys will take extreme, even lawless measures to protect Judge Graham. This post is part of an overall pattern and practice of using extreme measures and lawlessness to conceal the misconduct of Judge Graham. See Documented Allegations of Misconduct.

How Many Times Can a Court Refuse to Review an Order For Validity?

This post will demonstrate that the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals has set a Guinness world record for refusing to review a clearly void sua sponte pre-filing injunction that was rendered by “Teflon Don”, U.S. District Judge Donald L. Graham on September 20, 2001. The Eleventh Circuit has declined to reach the merits of this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction on multiple occasions. The denials invoke a kind of creative dishonesty. As a matter of fact, the denials are not consistent and even contradict each other on each successive attempt at appellate review. Even an ardent supporter of the system would have a hard time arguing that there is not a certain amount of dishonesty involved in the matter. The point here is that there has never been any appellate review of the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001. Yet this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction has been used as a weapon against Marcellus Mason. The Eleventh Circuit has elevated artifice to a level that would make a shister lawyer proud. The coup de grace is the Eleventh Circuit sat idly by while this clearly void sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction was used to form the basis of a criminal contempt complaint and conviction. See this outrageous story, “Eleventh Circuit Sits Idly By While A Clearly Void Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction Wreaks Havoc On A Man’s Life“.

Judicial Independence

This post also makes vividly clear why federal judges cannot and should not be trusted to discipline themselves. The information provided in this post is not only true, but you would not be able to get this information anywhere else. The Eleventh Circuit relies on ignorance and the public’s willingness to believe that its federal judges are honest, diligent, and trustworthy. America should not drink the American Bar Association’s, “ABA”, koolaid of judicial independence.

The Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction

On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham rendered a pre-fling injunction sua sponte, or on his own motion and without notice to the litigant Marcellus M. Mason. See Docket Entry Number 878, (D.E. # 878) . Page 3, of this document boldly asserts: THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte. This type of injunction is commonly referred to under several different names: “leave to file injunction”, “vexatious litigant injunction”, “pre-filing injunction”, “filing injunction”, “1651 injunction”. This order was rendered when the matter had been on appeal since June 25, 2001. This fact creates a potential jurisdictional problem. See Post, “Eleventh Circuit: Notice of Appeal Does Not Divest District Judge of Jurisdiction of Matters Involved In the Appeal!” to see how the Eleventh Circuit dishonestly handled this problem. For specific case law on sua sponte issued injunctions, see Case Law On Pre-Filing Injunctions, below. This same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction that Mason was not notice given notice and opportunity to respond to makes a so-called “finding of bad faith” that was subsequently used to award a heavily insured governmental entity attorney’s fees of $200,000. At pages 5,6, this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction asserts:

It has become clear to the Court that Mason is proceeding in bad faith. Indeed, he has admitted as much in his own pleadings and correspondence…Such activity is in bad faith and will not be permitted by the Court.

A finding of bad faith requires due process as well. ” “A court must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power, and it must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees,..” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991). See also Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir., 2001)(A court should be cautious in exerting its inherent power and “must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees.” ). See Judge Donald L. Graham Awards $200,000 Attorney’s Fees Against An Indigent. Apparently, Judge Graham does not have to do a damn thing even if the United States Supreme requires it.


Case No. 01-13664-A, Direct Appeal

The unpublished opinion rendered in this matter is a joke and model of dishonesty and deserved its own page and is a must read, see “Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664: The Appeal From Hell

This appeal was docketed under Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664. The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 27, 2001. See Docket No. 795.

On Mar. 6, 2002, the court strikes the Appellants’ Brief arguing against the September 20, 2001 order. The court states the order is “beyond the scope of appeal”. Court orders Mason to go through the expense of filing new briefs that have no reference to the September 20, 2001.

On Apr. 23, 2002, Court Strikes Appellees brief for citing the order of September 20, 2001.However court refuses to make Appellees file new briefs as they did the Appellant.

On Oct. 16, 2002, the Court, Stanley F. Birch, Jr.,Susan H. Black, and Stanley Marcus, affirms Judge Graham.At pg. 14, Court specifically uses the September 20, 2001 that it stated to Mason was “beyond the scope of appeal”.

Moreover, despite the closure of the case by the district court, Mason’s continual filing of motions with the court addressing matters previously settled prompted the district court to prohibit Mason from further filings without explicit permission and initiate criminal contempt proceedings.Therefore, the record supports the districts court’s implicit finding that a sanction less than dismissal of the action with prejudice would have no effect.


Case No, 01-15754, Mandamus

The Judges responsible for making this decision are Judges Susan H. Black, Rosemary Barkett, and Stanley Marcus. The Eleventh Circuit received a mandamus petition that was docketed as being received on October 2, 2001. See Receipt. This is a 25 page petition plus exhibits. Microsoft Word Format, html format, and pdf format. This petition attacks the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001. The Eleventh Circuit Court had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 from the moment the injunction of September 20, 2001 was issued even if the case was not closed like the matter at bar. According to the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit’s own binding precedents, this mandamus petition should have been treated as a notice of appeal. The Defendant, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners, and U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham also received a copy of the mandamus petition. Judge Graham did not file a brief in opposition to the petition. The Defendant did not file a responsive brief to the petition. The Eleventh Circuit did not require anyone to respond the petition.

For more on this mandamus, see this site post “Eleventh Circuit Disses The U.S. Supreme Court Chooses To Protect Judge Graham

In reply to the 25 page petition on December 5, 2001, the Eleventh Circuit rendered the following “Opinion”:

“The “petition for writ of mandamus and petition for writ of prohibition” is DENIED.” See “Opinion“, Case No. 01-15754.

Mason filed a motion for clarification seeking to know the basis upon which the decision was made or what the opinion stood for, however the Eleventh Circuit declined to discuss the matter.


Rehearing Denied

On January 25, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit denied a motion for clarification:

Petitioner’s “motion for reconsideration and clarification” of this Court’s December 5, 2001, Order, is DENIED as Petitioner has offered no reason sufficient to warrant either reconsideration or clarification of this Court’s Order.

Rehearing Denied

On or about February 06, 2004, Judges Susan H. Black, Rosemary Barkett, and Stanley Marcus were sent certified letters begging them to decide this matter. However, each of them declined to respond or do anything.


Case No. 01-16218

Judge Frank Hull rendered this opinion. On January 8, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit stated:

Although Mason has not filed a from the district court’s order denying IFP or the omnibus order requiring Mason to get court approval before filing any additional pleadings or lawsuits, Mason may raise all of these issues on appeal. See generally, Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107 (11 th Cir. 1985) (reviewing the district court’s order enjoining a defendants from filing additional pleadings unless they were first submitted by an attorney admitted to practice in that court); United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966 (11th Cir. 1999) (reviewing a district court’s decision not to recuse itself for abuse of discretion); Camp v. Oliver, 798 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1996) (reviewing district court’s order denying IFP for abuse of discretion).

See Opinion Case No. 01-16218.


Case No. 02-11476-A

On May 1, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit, Judge Joel F. Dubina, stated:

Mason also requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order enjoining Mason from to Mason’s former employment without first receiving permission from the district court. Although Mason has not filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s order requiring him to receive the permission of the district court from filing any additional pleadings or from filing any new lawsuits related to his former employment or subsequent interactions with the defendants, Mason may raise this issue on appeal. See generally, Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1985) (reviewing the district court’s order enjoining a defendant from filing additional pleadings unless they were first submitted by an attorney submitted by an attorney admitted to practice in that court). Mason has an adequate alternative remedy on appeal regarding this issue.

See Opinion Case No. 02-11476-A. This is quite a remarkable and incredible statement by Judge Dubina in that by May 1, 2002, as fully set forth above, the Eleventh Circuit has already declined to review this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction twice. See above, Case No. 01-15754 denied mandamus on December 5, 2001, and Case No. 01-13664-A, the brief was stricken on March 6, 2002 because it was said to be “beyond the scope of appeal”, then the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction used against Mason on October 16, 2002.


Case No. 02-14646, Mandamus

Judges R. Lanier Anderson, Joel F. Dubina, and Charles R. Wilson names are on this decision. On Oct. 7, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit stated:

This Appeal is DISMISSED, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant Marcellus Mason’s notice of appeal, filed on June 24, 2002, is untimely from the district court’s order enjoining him from filing additional pleading, entered on September 21, 2001.


Case No. 04-11894, Mandamus

Judges Ed Carnes and Frank M. Hull names appear on this opinion. On May 20, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit, among other things, admits to the following:

(2) vacatur of all of the decisions Judge Graham made in his case, including a September 20, 2001 order; (3) this Court to direct Judge Moore to dismiss his contempt case, number 02-14020-CR-KMM; and (4) this Court to issue an “emergency stay” with respect to the contempt case.

pg. 1, Opinion Case No. 04-11894.

At page 3, the Court asserts:

Moreover, Mason had an adequate alternative remedy to mandamus relief in that he could have timely appealed the September 20, 2001 order, but did not do so.

See pg. 3, Opinion Case No. 04-11894


Case No. 05-10623-I, Mandamus

Judge Rosemary Barkett made this decision. On March 16, 2005, the Eleventh Circuit, among other things, admits to the following:

[V]acate all decisions and rulings by Judge Graham in this case since February 1999, including the September 20, 2001 order enjoining him for filing any pleadings or additional related lawsuit without court; permission.

See Opinion pg. 1, Case No. 05-10623-I.

At pg. 2, the Eleventh Circuit asserted the following:“Furthermore, Mason appealed the dismissal of his case as well as the district court’s injunction order of September of 20, 2001...” See Pg. 2.

This statement is directly contradicted by the Eleventh Circuit’s prior assertion of May 20, 2004, Case No. 04-11894, pg. 4:”Moreover, Mason had an adequate remedy to mandamus relief in that he could have timely appealed the September 20, 2001, but did not do so.

The Eleventh Circuit has declined to review the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction on other occasions as well. See Appellate History.

The U.S. Supreme Court,”SCOTUS”, On the Importance of Due Process

“Courts as well as citizens are not free ‘to ignore all the procedures of the law….’. The ‘constitutional freedom’ of which the Court speaks can be won only if judges honor the Constitution.” Walker v. City Of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 338 (1967)(Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting). “Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole, constitutional system.” Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring). It is ingrained in our national traditions, and is designed to maintain them. In a variety of situations, the Court has enforced this requirement by checking attempts of executives, legislatures, and lower courts to disregard the deep-rooted demands of fair play enshrined in the Constitution.” id. 161. “Fairness of procedure is “due process in the primary sense.” Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 281 U. S. 681.

In a long line of cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that impingements of constitutional rights are, without variation, subject to the strictures of “due process” or notice and opportunity to be heard prior to their enactments. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Owen v. City Of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Carey v.Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).

Right of Access To Courts is Constitutionally Protected

The right of access to the Courts is clear according to the U.S. Supreme Court. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977);M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). The Supreme court has stated the right of access to the courts also protected by the First Amendment. BE&K Construction CO. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. 536 U.S. 516 (2001)(“the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government,” and that “[t]he right of access to the courts is … but one aspect of the right of petition.“). California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972)(“The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.“). See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)(recognizing “the fundamental right of access to the courts”); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)(“The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights.“).

Case Law On Pre-Filing Injunctions

US CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS HAVE ROUTINELY REJECTED “SUA SPONTE” PRE-FILING INJUNCTIONS.

A long line of United States appellate courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, have rejected sua sponte issuances of pre-filing injunctions because they are violations of due process. In Smith v. United States, 2010U.S. App. LEXIS 14050,*;386 Fed. Appx. 853 (11th Cir. 2010) , the
Eleventh Circuit held:

“Numerous persuasive authorities support the idea that due process requires notice and a hearing before a court sua sponte enjoins a party from filing further papers in support of a frivolous claim…Smith’s filing can therefore be construed as a motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). A judgment is void under that rule “‘if the court that rendered it . . . acted in a manner inconsistent  [*8]  with due process of law.'”..We therefore vacate and remand so that the district court may consider imposing a lesser restriction that will protect against abusive filings without improperly restricting Smith’s right of access to the courts.   If the district court decides that an injunction is necessary, Smith should be provided with an opportunity to oppose the injunction before it is instituted. “

It is remarkable that the Eleventh Circuit, sua sponte, or on its own motion, initiated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) to reverse Judge Maurice Mitchell Paul.  Also, in Weaver v. Leon County Sch. Bd., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8128 (11th Cir. 2006), the Eleventh Circuit held that a litigant was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a restriction was imposed on his ability to challenge an injunction. U.S. v. Powerstein, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 14928,*;185 Fed. Appx. 811 (11th Cir. 2006)(litigant entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the court imposed the injunctive order ). See Sires v. Fair, 107 F.3d 1;1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2173 (1st Cir. 1997); Cok v. Family Court of Rhode Island , 985 F.2d 32 (C.A.1 (R.I.), 1993) (vacating a pre-fling injunction issued without notice); MLE Realty Assocs. v. Handler, 192 F.3d 259, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23362 (2nd Cir. 1999) ; Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2000) ; Holton v. Oral Surg. Sing Sing Corr., 24 Fed. Appx. 37; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25151 (2nd Cir. 2001); Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 1998) (district court may not impose a filing injunction on a litigant without providing the litigant with notice and an opportunity to be heard.); Gonzales v. Feiner, 131 Fed. Appx. 373, * 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8370, ** (3rd Cir. 2005) ; Wiliams v. Cambridge Integrated Servs. Group , 148 Fed Appx. 87, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 18624 (3rd Cir. 2005) ; Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027 (C.A.3 (Virgin Islands), 1992)(vacating a sua sponte issued injunction); It is imperative that the court afford the litigant notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to issuing such an injunction. In Re Head, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8265,*;174 Fed. Appx. 167 (4th Cir. 2006)(vacated a 10 yr. old sua sponte injunction);Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 819 (4th Cir. 2004)(vacating a pre-filing injunction issued without notice); Tucker v. Drew, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11784 (4 th Cir. 1994) ;DOUGLAS BAUM v. BLUE MOON VENTURES, LLC , 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 91,*;513 F.3d 181;49 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 68 (5th Cir. 2008)(“Notice and a hearing are required if the district court sua sponte imposes a pre-filing injunction or sua sponte modifies an existing injunction to deter vexatious filings.”) ;De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir.) ; Roscoe v. Hansen, 107 F.3d 880;1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4996 (10th Cir. 1997); Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20966,*;500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007)(litigant must be given notice and a chance to be heard before the [injunctive] order is entered.); Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351,354 (C.A.10 (Wyo.), 1989)(vacated and holding that the litigant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to oppose the court’s order before it is instituted.); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F.Supp. 146 (M.D. Fla., 1983)(court issued a show cause order) Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1110 (C.A.11 (Fla.), 1985) (held that district court did give adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before issuance of the injunction); Cofield v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm., 936 F.2d 512, 514 (11th Cir.1991)(noting that court issued show cause order prior to rendering pre-fling injunction); In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C.Cir.1988)(reversing and holding If a pro se litigant is to be deprived of such a vital constitutional right as access to the courts, he should, at least, be provided with an opportunity to oppose the entry of an order restricting him before it is entered.); Martin v. Circuit Court, 627 So.2d 1298 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., 1993)(reversing a pre-filing order and holding that limiting the constitutional right of access to the courts, essential due process safeguards must first be provided); Lawsuits of Carter, In re, 510 S.E.2d 91, 95; 235 Ga.App. 551 (Ga. App., 1998)(reversing a pre-filing injunction because notice or an opportunity not given);Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that injunctions “may not be expanded beyond the meaning of its terms absent notice and an opportunity to be heard.”).

Courts have felt that the notice and opportunity to respond was so important that they have reversed district courts even where they thought the pre-filing injunction was otherwise valid. See Oliver, In re, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (C.A.3 (Pa.), 1982); Scott v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage , 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15709,*;143 Fed. Appx. 525(4th Cir. 2005);Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987). The United States Supreme Court has stated: A court must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power, and it must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees. (emphasis added) Chambers v.Nasco, Inc.,501U.S. 32, 50 (1991).


.

Pre-filing Restrictions

1. Plaintiff Marcellus M. Mason is Permanently enjoined

from filing any additional pleadings in case numbers 99-14027- CIV-GRAHAM, 00-14116-CIV-GRAHAM, 00-14201-CIV-GRAHAM, 00-I4202- CIV-GRAHAM, 00-14240-CIV-GRAHAM, 01-14074-CIV-GRAHAM, 01-14078- CIV-GRAHAM, and 01-14230-CIV-GRAHAM or from filing any new lawsuit which relates in any way to Plaintiff Marcellus M. Mason’s former employment and/or subsequent interactions with Defendants without first receiving permission from the Court, as set forth below. This injunction shall apply equally to any persons or entities acting at the behest, direction, or instigation, or in concert with Marcellus M. Mason.

2. Any request for permission to file a new lawsuit relating to the issues in the above captioned cases and/or Mason’s former employment and/or subsequent interactions with Defendants SHALL be in the form of an application filed with the Clerk of Court and addressed to United States District Judge Donald L. Graham. This application shall consist of a one paragraph explanation of the issues in the proposed lawsuit, shall contain the names of all proposed parties and shall not exceed one page. The application shall not include any proposed pleadings.

See Docket Entry No. 878.

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Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson Aggressively Defends Judge Donald L. Graham

April 17, 2008

Judge Donald L. GrahamJudge Donald L. Graham

Foreword

There’s an old Negro spiritual called “May the Work I’ve Done Speak for Me”. In this same spirit, this author allows the work of Chief Circuit Judge J.L. Edmondson and his cohorts to speak for them. Unlike, Judge Graham and his enablers, their work will not be characterized or mis-characterized it will be produced in full and publicly available for the reading public to make their own assessments. The record fully supports the idea that Judge Edmondson and his colleagues at the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals have defined the concept of “judicial misconduct” out of existence. Moreover, the record here will reveal that Judge Edmondson and his colleagues will not mention the allegations of misconduct raised against Judge Graham, much less test them for veracity.

What To Focus On

  • The allegations of misconduct are not denied.
  • The allegations of misconduct are rarely mentioned.
  • The Allegations of misconduct were ignored in the appellate process
    • Usurping Legal Authority
    • Refusing to Rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction
    • Allowing Scores of Motion to Languish
    • Judge attempted to arrogate his own authority by ordering the clerk to return notices of appeals without filing them.

      • intentionally lying and misrepresenting the law;
      • refusing to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction for more than 15 months;
      • allowing scores of motions to go undecided;
      • and usurping legal authority.
      • The complaint alleges (Core Allegations):
      • intentionally lying and misrepresenting the law;
      • refusing to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction for more than 15 months;
      • allowing scores of motions to go undecided;
      • and usurping legal authority.
    • See Complaint and Order, Judicial Council Order.

      December 14, 2001, Judge R. Lanier Anderson renders order dismissing the complaint due to:

      The allegations of the Complaint are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling”. Additionally, this complainant currently has pending in this court several Petitions for Writs of Mandamus that address this issue. Consequently, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 372(c)(3)(A) and Addendum Three Rule 4(a)(2) this Complaint is Dismissed.

      When Judge Anderson wrote this order, the Eleventh Circuit had already had denied the mandamus petition, Case No. 01-15754, which he references in his order dismissing this complaint. Consequently, Judge Anderson knows that Judge Graham’s misconduct has not been discussed, much less remedied.


      INTERVENING MANDAMUS

      December 5, 2001, in a terse one page, (Case No. 01-15754), “opinion” denies relief. “The “petition for writ of mandamus and petition for writ of prohibition” is DENIED.”
      January 25, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit refuses to give the basis for its opinion of December 5, 2001 and denies a motion for rehearing or clarification.

      Complaint No. 02-0029

      Judge Graham attempted to use the contempt process to force Mason to drop a lawsuit filed against him.

      In this Complaint, Mr. Mason makes the unsupported allegation that Judge Graham has “improperly and illegally used his office to bring criminal contempt charges against me since the imitation (sic) of my last complaint on February 8, 2002”. Although Mr. Mason does not submit any evidence or documentation in support of his allegation, Judge Graham did in fact issue an Order to Show Cause regarding possible contempt charges against Mr. Mason detailing why Mr. Mason should be charged with criminal contempt, Not one reason cited in this order relates to any complaints having been filed against Judge Graham by Mr. Mason. The allegations that Judge Graham improperly and illegally issued the Order to Show Cause, and that it was issued in retaliation for Mr. Mason having filed complaints against judge Graham are clearly disputed by Mr. Mason’s behavior and obvious disregard for Judge Graham’s Omnibus Order and are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling”, Therefore, pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A) and Addendum III Rule 4(a)(2), this Complaint is Dismissed .

      See Complaint and Order.


      COMPLAINTS FILED IN 2005

      A Series of complaints, Nos. 05-00008, 05-0011, 05-0012, 05-0013, 05-0020, and 05-0021, were filed in 2005. In order to keep Judge Edmondson from viewing allegations of misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance against Judge Graham in isolation, Mason included the following allegations in all the complaints so that Judge Graham’s record could be viewed in the aggregate.

      Additionally, in 2005, Judge Edmondson knows for certain that Judge Graham has escaped appellate review because the Eleventh Circuit, though fully briefed, refused to discuss whether Judge Graham should have disqualified. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit declined to discuss the allegations of misconduct and abuse that Mason used to support the thesis that Judge Graham should have disqualified. See, Case No. 01-13664, Unpublished Opinion.


      Complaint No. 05-0008

      Complaint filed January 29, 2005.

      Additionally, Judge Graham knowing falsely created a Civil Justice Act Report that concealed the fact that he had a motion for a preliminary injunction pending for more than 15 months. Judge Edmondson reply to these allegations:

      In this complaint, the single (unsupported) allegation that has not already been determined in previous complaints filed by Mr. Mason against Judge Graham is that Judge Graham intentionally falsified his March 31, 2001, Civil Justice Reform Act Report in an attempt to conceal the fact that he had not ruled on one of Mr. Mason’s motions for over 15 months. Notwithstanding the fact that the motion in question was pending for more than six months, and the fact that the March 31, 2001 report is incorrect, Mr. Mason has not presented any information, evidence or documentation to support his claim to suggest that the omission of this motion on this CJRA report was an intentional attempt by Judge Graham to conceal his failure to rule on the motion. The allegations of this Complaint are “frivolous”, “successive”, and “appropriate corrective action has been taken”. Therefore, pursuant to Chapter 16 of Title 28 U .S.C. § 352 (b)(I)(ii) and Addendum III Rules 4 (b)(3) and (4) and 18(c) this Complaint is DISMISSED.


      Order 05-0011. Complaint No. 05-0011
      Complaint filed January 31, 2005.
      This complaint, in addition to the core allegations, alleges the following:
      Judge Graham has arrogated his own authority, much like Sadam Hussein, Stalin, Hitler, other infamous autocrats and dictators. Specific acts of misconduct committed by Mr. Graham include, but is not limited to the following:
      Concocting a patently illegal injunction or pre-filing screening under the guise of “inherent authority”. See (D.E. 878), URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/DE-878/de878.pdf.Using this patently illegal injunction to initiate and gain a criminal contempt conviction. Allowing the Eleventh Circuit to use this patently illegal injunction, (D.E. 878), rendered on September 20, 2001 , to affirm the dismissal of a case, 99-14027-CV-Graham, that closed on June 20, 2001. Imagine that! Allowing the Eleventh Circuit to destroy my right under the “rule of law” to appeal this patently illegal injunction, (D.E. 878).Using intimidation by ordering me, Robert Waters, AUSA, Frank Smith, U.S. Probation, and others to come to a “Status/Motion Hearing” on January 9, 2005. Abusing his office and circumventing the appellate process by ordering me not to file any one page requests to file Rule 60(b) motions and refusing to put this illegal order in writing so that it can be challenged on appeal. July 7, 2005, Judge Edmondson answered these allegations:

      In this complaint, there are only two allegations that have not been determined in previous complaints filed by Mr. Mason against Judge Graham. Mr. Mason first complains that Judge Graham issued a verbal order on January 14, 2005, which advised him not to file any further pleadings with the court . Mr. Mason then complains that this order was not in writing to prevent him from filing an appeal. The allegations of this Complaint are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling or frivolous or both”, and the allegations of the complaint “lack any factual foundation or are conclusively refuted by objective evidence” . Therefore, pursuant to Chapter 16 of Title 28 U .S .C. § 352(b)(1)(ii) and Addendum III Rules 4(b)(2)(3) and (4) this Complaint is DISMISSED.


      Order No. 05-0012. Complaint No. 05-0012

      COMPLAINT FILED FEBRUARY 7, 2005. SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT AND JUDICIAL ABUSE

      1. Mr. Graham abused his office by having the U.S. Marshall, Keith L. Kluttz, come and interrogate me at my home on or about February 5, 2004 when he had no earthly reason to do so.
      2. Mr. Graham abused his office by ordering me to come to “Status/Motion Hearing” on January 14, 2005 on a closed civil case, 99-14027.
      3. Mr. Graham conducted a quasi criminal hearing under the guise or cloak of a “Status/Motion Hearing” in a civil matter. The AUSA and U.S. Parole were attendance at this “Status/Motion Hearing”. I was unrepresented by a competent criminal defense lawyer.
      4. Graham ordered me to answer his intimidating questions in violation of my Fifth Amendment rights. Mr. Graham gave me no warning that my statements could be used against me even though the U.S. Attorney and U.S. Probation were in attendance.

      On January 9, 2005, Mr. Graham concocted what he termed a “Status/Motion Hearing” order. This order was then certified on January 10, 2005 by one of Mr. Graham’s clerks. This order specifically demands that the following individuals be there: Frank Smith, U.S. Probation, Robert Waters, AUSA, Lynn Waxman, Appellate Attorney, Maria Sorolis, counsel for Highlands County. This order was picked up by Fedex on January 10, 2005 and delivered to my home on January 11, 2005. Mr. Graham scheduled this hearing for January 14, 2005 at 15:30 in Fort Pierce. Mr. Graham was already scheduled to be in Fort Pierce on this date. Mr. Graham made no effort to talk to me or my appellate attorney about dates that would be convenient to us. Mr. Graham made no prior contact with me or Ms. Waxman. At this hearing, Mr. Graham made absolutely no mention of the merits of any pending motion in the civil case, 99-14027. Mr. Graham kept saying the case was closed and not to ‘file’ anymore Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. motions or requests to file Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. motions. Mr. Graham asked U.S. Probation about the terms of my probation. Why is this needed in a civil matter?
      For what purpose did AUSA Robert Waters and US Parole Officer Frank Smith attend a “Status/Motion Hearing” in a civil matter? Mr. Graham has refused to put any of the “commands” he made in writing so that they could be held up to public scrutiny. Mr. Graham felt it important enough to hastily concoct a “Status/Motion Hearing”, but not important enough to memorialize is “commands” to writing. Mr. Graham does not have the legal authority to demand, under the threat of arrest, that I attend a “Status/Motion Hearing” on a closed civil case. Mr. Graham had a deputy US Marshall come by my home and interrogate me without the presence of counsel even though criminal contempt case was pending, Case No. 02-14020-CR-Moore. I was questioned by the U.S. Marshall without benefit of having an attorney present. Mr. Graham had no probable cause to send the US Marshal to my house. The mere fact that Mr. Graham disagrees with my unrelenting attacks on his record and personal integrity is not sufficient reason to “sick the dogs on me”, or US Marshal. The US Marshal’s office is not Mr. Graham’s private police force.
      June 27, 2005, Judge Edmondson states:

      In this complaint, there are four allegations that have not been determined in previous complaints filed by Mr. Mason against Judge Graham. Mr. Mason complains that Judge Graham abused his office by ordering him to appear at a Status/Motion hearing held on January 14, 2005, and that Judge Graham scheduled this hearing without any attempt to talk with him or his attorney about dates that were suitable for them. Mr. Mason also complains that Judge Graham ordered him to answer intimidating questions at this hearing without warning that his statements could be used against him even though the U.S. Attorney and U.S. Probation offices were represented and present at this hearing. Mr. Mason further complains that Judge Graham improperly and without good cause sent the U.S. Marshals as his own private police force.

      The allegations of this Complaint are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling”, frivolous”. and the allegations of the complaint “lack any factual foundation or are conclusively refuted by objective evidence” and “successive”. Therefore, pursuant to Chapter 16 of Title 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(ii) and Addendum III Rules 4(b)(2)(3)(4) and 18 (c) this Complaint is DISMISSED. Order No. 05-0012.

      Complaint No. 05-0013

      Complaint filed February 8, 2005
      In addition to the core allegations, this complaint alleges:
      Mr. Graham abused his office by ordering me to come to a “HEARING ON CONDUCT OF PARTIES DURING PROCEEDINGS” on December 4, 2001 on a closed civil case, 99-14027. The case was closed on June 20, 2001.This case was on appeal since June 25, 2001, consequently, Mr. Graham no longer had jurisdiction over the case. Why do I need to a ““NOTICE OF HEARING ON CONDUCT OF PARTIES DURING PROCEEDINGS” on a closed case? Does Mr. Graham get to order me to come to a hearing anytime he gets ready?
      Judge Edmondson’s reply:

      In this complaint Mr. Mason alleges that Judge Graham abused his office by ordering to appear at a hearing on December 4, 2001, when the case in question, No. 99-CV-14027, was closed and on appeal at the time the hearing was scheduled. The allegations of this Complaint are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling”. Therefore, pursuant to Chapter 16 of Title 28 U .S .C. § 352(b)(1)(ii) and Addendum III Rules 4(b)(2)(3) and (4) this Complaint is DISMISSED. Order No. 05-0013.

      Complaint No. 05-0020

      Complaint filed February 16, 2005
      This complaint alleges:
      Judge illegally blocked Mason’s access to the courts by improperly denying motions to proceed without payment, in forma pauperis, on 18 different occasions, while refusing to cite a legal or factual reason for doing so as required by law.
      Graham allowed IFP motions to linger for months in violation of S.D.Fla. Local Rule 7.1.B.3 which calls for a hearing on motion in 90 days. (DE #8, 9-18-2001). Plaintiff’s motion was filed on 3/12/01 (DE #2). It took Graham more than six months to create a reason to deny this motion that was not denied until 9-18-2001. See (DE #8, 9-18-2001).
      Graham deliberately stated misleading facts or outright lied in justifying his injunction of September 20, 2001, (DE 878), by using the very unfiled lawsuits that he denied me IFP status to support this patently illegal injunction . For the purpose of justifying the injunction, (DE 878), Mr. Graham counted the following lawsuits as being “filed”: (1)Case No. 00-14202, (2)Case No. 00-14201, (3)Case No. 00-14116, (4)Case No. 01-14074, (5)01-14078, See pgs. 1-2, DE-878, URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/DE-878/de878.pdf. Mr. Graham states, “Marcellus M. Mason (“Mason”) has filed eleven (11)cases and/or counterclaims in this District…” According to Mr. Graham’s own definition of “filing”, “A complaint is not considered filed until the filing fee is paid.” See (DE -10) Case No. 00-14201. See also (DE -10) Case No. 00-14202. No filing fee was paid in either of the above cases because Graham arbitrarily denied me the benefit of the in forma pauperis statutes. Using Graham’s own definition there were only 11 minus 5 or 6 lawsuits “filed.” Case No. 00-14240 which Graham also counts was actually filed by Highlands County, not me. Now Graham has only 5 lawsuits filed. Case No. 01-14230 was filed in state court and removed to the S.D. Fla. by Highlands County after Graham crafted the injunction where they knew the case would be assigned to Graham. See Notice of Removal, URL: http://geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/01-14230/NoticeOfRemoval.pdf. Graham now has only four lawsuits that I filed, not the 11 he concocted. See Litigation Summary, URL:http://mmason.freeshell.org/LitigationSummary.doc . The four remaining lawsuits Case Numbers 99-14042, 99-14257, 99-14314 were consolidated with Case number 99-14027.

      Judge Edmondson’s reply:

      In this complaint Mr. Mason, although worded differently that his previous complaints, re-makes the allegation that Judge Graham denied him access to the courts by summarily denying a string of motions for in forma pauperis and that Judge Graham did not identify either of the only two reasons allowed for such denial. The allegations of this Complaint are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling” and “successive”. Therefore, pursuant to Chapter 16 of Title 28 U .S .C. § 352(b)(1)(ii) and Addendum III Rules 4(b)(2)(3) and (4) this Complaint is DISMISSED.

      Order No. 05-0021. Complaint No. 05-0021

      Complaint filed February 19, 2005
      This complaint alleges:
      Mr. Graham should have disqualified himself long before any motion for attorney’s fees had been presented. “Disqualification is mandatory for conduct that calls a judge’s impartiality into question.” U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). As this Complaint and previous complaints clearly demonstrate Judge Graham should have disqualified himself because he: (1)he intentionally misrepresented the law; (2)refused to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction for more than 16 months;(3)usurped legal authority by requiring me to seek the permission of a private law firm to communicate with my government;(4)allowed scores of motions to go undecided; (5)concocted a “pre-filing” injunction;(5)lied on a Civil Justice Act Report;(6)See Section 372(c) complaints docketed under Case Nos. 05-0008, 05-0011, 05-0012, 05-0013, and a complaint dated Wednesday, February 16, 2005 for more reasons Graham should have disqualified. Mr. Graham and his Magistrate awarded the Defendants, Highlands County, a whopping award of $200,000 that he admitted in writing had nothing to do with the law or the “merits”. Mr. Graham even lied in order to award the defendants $200,000 in attorney’s fees. These allegations are fully supported by the following RECORD facts. See (DE #882), URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/DE-882/de882.pdf . (DE 891), URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/DE-891/de891.pdf . Judge Graham intentionally lied in order to award attorney’s fees of $200,000. Mr. Graham admitted that he knew the law and was not going to follow it with respect to the awards of attorney’s fees. At page 3 of the Report and Recommendation, Graham and his Magistrate admit that Christiansburg Garment Company v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) is the standard for awarding attorney’s fees. Mr. Graham and his Magistrate admit that I had no chance of paying $200,000 in attorney’s fees but awarded it to the defendants anyway. After awarding the Defendants $200, 000 in attorney’s fees against me, Mr. Graham then decided to deny me in forma pauperis status to appeal this travesty. Moreover, Mr. Graham refused to offer any lawful reason for denying me IFP status. See (DE #906), URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/DE-906/de906.pdf . I prevailed on a summary judgment in a lawsuit filed against me by Highlands County and Mr. Graham refused to award me costs of less than $200.00. See (DE #27), URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/00-14240/de27.pdf ; (DE #33), URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/00-14240/Doc33/de33.pdf ; (DE #35), URL: http://mmason.freeshell.org/00-14240/Doc35/1.jpg . Judge Edmondson’s reply:

      In this complaint Mr. Mason repeats allegations, filed in previous complaints, that Judge Graham should have recused himself, that Judge Graham refused to rule on several motions, and that Judge Graham required him to seek permission from a private law firm to communicate with his government. The only new allegation in this complaint concerns the attorney fees awarded by Judge Graham to the defendants in the amount of $200,000. Mr. Mason claims Judge Graham lied in order to grant the fees. The allegations of this Complaint are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling” and “successive”. Therefore, pursuant to Chapter 16 of Title 28 U .S .C. § 352(b)(1)(ii) and Addendum III Rules 4(b)(2)(3) and (4) this Complaint is DISMISSED.

      Order No. 05-0021.

      What makes this order particularly offensive is that both Judge Graham, for no stated reason, and the Eleventh Circuit, both denied Mason the opportunity to appeal the $200, 000 judgment. The Eleventh Circuit claimed the appeal of the $200,000 attorney’s fees was frivolous without providing a scintilla of evidence to support its mere fortuitous and self-serving conclusion.
      On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham rendered a pre-fling injunction sua sponte, or on his motion and without notice to the litigant Marcellus M. Mason. See Docket Entry Number 878, (D.E. # 878) . Page 3, of this document boldly asserts: THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte.
      EVEN MORE INCREDIBLE IS THE FACT THAT THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT REFUSES TO REVIEW THIS SUA SPONTE ISSUED PRE-FILING INJUNCTION FOR VALIDITY. SEE mmason.freeshell.org/SuaSponte.htm#AppellateHistory.

  • When Does Judge Graham become Accountable?


    Judge Edmondson’s Attack on the Complainant

    On May 2, 2005, Circuit Judge J.L. Edmondson, Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal stated:

    Of the eight complaints not specifically naming Judge Graham as the complained–of judge, five name judges of this Court who served on panels reviewing Mr. Mason’s appeals — panels that affirmed decisions and rulings by Judge Graham. None of Mr. Mason’s judicial complaints have prevailed. All of the complaints that have been resolved to date have been dismissed for some or all of the following reasons: the complaints were (1) plainly untrue; (2) frivolous; (3) successive; (4) conclusively refuted by objective evidence; (5) lacking in factual foundation; (5) lacking in evidence sufficient to raise an inference that misconduct had occurred; or (6) directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling…Eight of Mr. Mason’s twenty-one judicial complaints are still pending before this Court: Complaint numbers 05-0011, 05-0012, 05-0013, 05-0020, 05-0021, 05- 0022, 05-0023, and 05-0036. Six of those complaints name Judge Graham while the other two name judges of this Court who served on panels that affirmed decisions or rulings issued by Judge Graham. Four of the complaints are, on their face, successive. Accordingly, determination of those eight complaints will be held in abeyance pending the resolution of this Show Cause Order

    See Show Cause Order.

    The Perfect Scam

    IMPORTANT BACKGROUND AND CONCURRENT FACTS

    In order to fully understand the lengths that Judge Edmondson and his cohorts at the Eleventh Circuit are willing to go through to conceal the acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance committed by Judge Donald L. Graham, one must read the opinions in the direct appeal, Case
    No. 01-13664
    and mandamus petition, Case No. 01-15754 (“The “petition for writ of mandamus and petition for writ of prohibition” is DENIED.)in conjunction with the complaints listed below. The Eleventh Circuit does not deny the allegations it simply ignores them. In the direct appeal, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledges that it was briefed on the issue that Judge Graham should have disqualified because of the alleged misconduct, however, it refuses to discuss this issue on appeal (“Mason also raises issues that relate to non-sanction matters, … the denial of his motions to disqualify the district court and magistrate judges,“). Similarly, it refuses to discuss this issue in mandamus petition.

    The Eleventh Circuit and Judge Edmondson employed a perfect strategy to conceal these allegations of misconduct. The direct appeal and mandamus orders are non-published. Neither of these opinions have ever been available in the Court’s database or released. Couple this fact, with the fact that the Judicial Misconduct Complaints are kept confidential no one would ever know save this website.

    It is noteworthy and quite revealing that upon reading the complaints and Judge Edmondson’s replies that he does not deny, because he can not, any of the allegations set forth in any of the complaints below.

    The point of the foregoing is that Judge Edmondson and his cohorts knew full well that when these complaints were lodged that the Eleventh Circuit had already refused to address these allegations in the appellate process. Consequently, there is no remedy for these acts of misconduct and abuse.


    Complaint #01-0054

    This complaint raised the following allegations:

    Complaint No. 01-0054. On November 7, 2001, former Chief Judge R. Lanier Anderson, without denying the truth of the allegations, stated:

    Marcellus M. Mason. Jr. filed this complaint against United States District Judge Donald L. Graham, pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) and Addendum Three to the Rules of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit. The allegations of the Complaint are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling” and/or ‘Action on the complaint is no longer necessary because of intervening events, and intervening events”. Consequently, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A) and (3)(B) and Addendum Three Rule 4 (a)(2), this Complaint is DISMISSED.

    On March 5, 2002, the Judicial Council declined to do a review. See Order.


    Case No. 01-0068

    Complaint No. 01-0068

    Complaint filed on November 27, 2001