Posts Tagged ‘finding of bad faith’

Same Facts, Judge Wilbur D. Owens Reversed, Judge Donald L. Graham Affirmed

October 30, 2008

Justice Turned On Its Head

Justice Turned On Its Head

Judge Donald L. GrahamJudge Donald L. Graham, “Teflon Don”, A Bad Mother&&#!@, Shut Your Mouth!!

Point of This Post

The Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal,  effectively affirmed or upheld U.S. District Judge Donald L. Graham, Southern District of Florida,  on appeal for the exact same set of facts that his colleague, Senior Judge Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., Middle District of  Georgia, was reversed for on appeal. In their individual cases, both Judge Graham and Judge Owens used their inherent power to make a finding of “bad faith”; however, Judge Owens was reversed on appeal for failing to afford the sanctioned party due process while Judge Graham committed the exact same error but was not reversed.  In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has refused to address the validity of the order making the “bad faith” finding in what has to be a Guinness world record number of times.  Incidentally, the Eleventh Circuit has a long history of affirming Judge Graham on appeal while reversing his colleagues for the exact same set of facts. For example, see the following posts:

It is hard not to conclude that Judge Graham is clearly favored over his colleagues  in the Eleventh Circuit.  Incidentally, Judge Owens was sent a fax informing his of post and all his law clerks have received emails regarding this matter.

Senior Judge Wilbur D. Owens, Jr.

Senior Judge Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, Case No. 04-00080-CV-WDO-5 was reversed for using his inherent power to make a bad faith finding without affording a litigant due process.  In Adkins v. Christie, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 8322,*;227 Fed. Appx. 804 (11th Cir. 2007), the Eleventh Circuit stated:

[A] federal court possesses the inherent power to impose sanctions. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2132, 115 L. Ed. 2d 27 (1991). However, the court must afford the sanctioned party due process, “both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees.” In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995). Due process mandates that an attorney be given fair notice that his conduct may warrant sanctions and the reasons why. Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1559-60 (11th Cir. 1987). In addition, the attorney must be given a chance to respond to the allegations and justify his or her actions. In re Mroz, 65 F.3d at 1575-76. We find that the requirements of due process were not satisfied in this case.

Similarly, in In Re: Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc. v. Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc.,456 F.3d 1291(11th Cir. 2006), the court held:

Courts must afford a sanctioned party due process, both in determining the bad faith required to invoke the court’s inherent power to impose sanctions and in assessing fees. In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995) [*35]  (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 49, 111 S. Ct. at 2135). “Due process requires that the [party] be given fair notice that [its] conduct may warrant sanctions and the reasons why.” Id. (citing Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1559-60 (11th Cir. 1987)).

Judge Donald L. Graham

U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham, who like Senior Judge Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., above,  used his inherent power to make a bad faith finding without affording the litigant due process, but was not reversed on appeal unlike Judge Owens.  As a matter of fact, the Eleventh Circuit has refused to review the order making the finding of bad faith for validity on multiple occasions.

On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham issued a pre-filing injunction against Marcellus Mason sua sponte. (D.E. #878). Courts routinely reject sua sponte issued pre-filing injunctions without batting an eye.  See http://mmason.freeshell.org/RejectSuaSponte.htm.  This order specifically states: “THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte.” (D.E. #878, pg. 3;).  Incidentally, when Judge Graham rendered this order on September 20, 2001, the case was closed and had been noticed for appeal and assigned Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664 since June 25, 2001.  See Notice of Appeal, (D.E. #795).

In this same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction Judge Graham makes a so-called “finding of bad faith“. “It has become clear to the Court that Mason is proceeding in bad faith.. Such activity is in bad faith and will not be permitted by the Court.” (D.E. #878, pg. 5, 6, “Bad Faith” section).

Judge Graham then took this so-called finding of bad-faith and then used it to award attorney’s fees of $200,000 against Marcellus Mason even though neither he nor the Eleventh Circuit ever gave Mason the opportunity to oppose the order.  A Report and Recommendation, “R&R”, was issued and stated:

Judge Graham’s order of September 20, 2001, also makes a specific finding of bad faith . Judge Graham stated, “It has become clear to the Court that Mason is proceeding in bad faith.


See “R&R”,
(D.E. #882, pgs. 3).

Judge Graham stated that such activity is in bad faith and will not be permitted by the Court. Even though bad faith is not a prerequisite to an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant, if the plaintiff is found to have brought such a civil rights action or to have continued such an action in bad faith, there will be an even stronger basis for charging him with attorney’s fees incurred by the defense. Here, it is clear that based upon Judge Graham’s previous findings of bad faith,…

See “R&R”, (D.E. #882, pgs. 3).

Judge Graham accepted this R&R.  See (D.E. 891)(“Defendants are awarded the sum of $200,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees in this case.”).

Eleventh Circuit Upholds Judge Graham’s Abusive and Unlawful Behavior

In Case No. 01-15754, a Petition for Mandamus, pps. 15-18, was filed on October 1, 2001, or eleven days after the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001 that made a finding of bad faith was rendered. See receipt.  On December 5, 2001, the Eleventh Circuit refused to review the September 20, 2001 order and bad faith finding for validity and in a terse one sentence opinion stated:

The ‘petition for writ of mandamus and petition for writ of prohibition’ is DENIED.

See Order Denying Mandamus.

Mason then sought to have the order of September 20, 2001 that made the “bad faith” finding reviewed for validity in the pending direct appeal, Case No.  01-13364.  However, in a really despicable and dishonest act, the Eleventh Circuit struck Mason’s brief for arguing against the validity of the order of September 20, 2001 because the Eleventh Circuit claimed the order was beyond the scope of appeal.  Notwithstanding this fact, the Eleventh Circuit then turned around and used this order to affirm Judge Graham in the very same appeal, Case No. 01-13664.   See “Putrid Dishonesty:Beyond the Scope of Appeal ” for proof of this pernicious and blatantly dishonest act.  The story gets even more incredulous because Mason subsequently made a multiplicity of attempts to get the September 20, 2001 order reviewed for validity; however, the Eleventh Circuit used ingenuity and trickery that would make the shister lawyer proud in order to avoid reviewing this order for validity.  See Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals, Sets Guiness World Record For Refusing to Review Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction.

Judge Graham then escalated the matter by using this clearly void sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction to form the basis of a criminal contempt complaint. See
Eleventh Circuit Sits Idly By While A Clearly Void Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction Wreaks Havoc On A Man’s Life.

JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST U.S. JUDGE DONALD L. GRAHAM

Judge Graham has engaged in reckless, lawless, and vindictive behavior, which includes, but is not limited to the following:

  • Lying and intentionally misrepresenting law.  See Core Allegations.
  • Refusing to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction that
    had been pending for more than 17 months.  See Core Allegations.
  • Allowing scores of motions and filings to languish without being
    decided.  See Languishing Motions.
  • Usurping legal authority. Allowing a Magistrate to issue an injunction prohibiting direct communication with the Highlands County Government.  Additionally, prohibiting  Marcellus Mason from making public records request under Florida Law directly to Highlands County.  See Usurp,
    Usurp2
    , and Usurp3.
  • Violating clearly established law and the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court by issuing pre-filing injunctions without notice and opportunity to be heard.  See Pre-filing Injunction.
  • Abuse of the criminal contempt procedure.  Judge Graham took a clearly invalid sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction and made it the basis of a criminal contempt complaint and conviction.  See Framed.
  • Lying and intentionally misrepresenting material facts. See Intentionally Misstating Facts.
  • Ignoring the U.S. Supreme Court denying access to the courts by refusing to state any reason for denying IFP applications.  See IFP Denials.
  • Awarding attorneys’ fees of $200,000 against an indigent plaintiff in total
    disregard of the law and the United States Supreme Court.  Massive Attorney’s Fees Award.

Judge Graham has a host of judicial misconduct filed against him. Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson’s has dismissed most of these complaints by simply defining judicial misconduct out of existence. State court judges have been removed for less reasons than the conduct committed by Judge Graham. Read the following complaints and Judge Edmondson’s reply and form your own judgment. The following complaints have been lodged against Teflon Don, or U.S. District Judge Donald L. Graham.

Pending Judicial Misconduct Complaints

Complaint Status

Judicial Conference
pending

Reconsideration
pending

June 25, 2008
pending

July 9, 2008
pending

July 15, 2008
pending

It has been said that the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability,
has become quite serious in investigating federal judges for misconduct. According to law.com,Binding National Rules Adopted for Handling Judicial Misconduct Complaints, in March of this year, the Judicial Conference adopted the first-ever binding nationwide procedures for handling complaints of judicial misconduct. U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham has escaped discipline for his abusive and possible criminal behavior.  As a result of this, Mason submitted complaints to both the Judicial Conference and Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson, Eleventh Circuit, US Court of Appeal again.  These complaints are governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364, “The Judicial Improvements Act of 2002” formerly “The Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act“. Previously, Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson, had been misconstruing the statute and summarily dismissing complaints of misconduct by simply regurgitating the statutory language at 28 U.S.C. § 352 which allows him dismiss complaints that are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling“.  Judge Edmondson is alone in his view that legal error and judicial misconduct are mutually exclusive.  For more discussion on “legal error” and judicial misconduct, see article
Chief Circuit Judge J.L. Edmondson Uses Perfect Scam of Negative Definition To Defeat Complaints of Misconduct Under the Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act
.

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Is U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham Willfully Defying The United States Supreme Court?

May 31, 2008

Justice Turned On Its Head

Justice Turned On Its Head

Judge Donald L. GrahamJudge Donald L. Graham, The “Teflon Don

Preface

A district judge may not respectfully (or disrespectfully) disagree with his learned colleagues on his own court of appeals who have ruled on a controlling legal issue, or with Supreme Court Justices writing for a majority of the Court. Binding authority within this regime cannot be considered and cast aside; it is not merely evidence of what the law is. Rather, case law on point is the law. If a court must decide an issue governed by a prior opinion that constitutes binding authority, the later court is bound to reach the same result, even if it considers the rule unwise or incorrect. Binding authority must be followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to do so…A decision of the Supreme Court will control that corner of the law unless and until the Supreme Court itself overrules or modifies it. Judges of the inferior courts may voice their criticisms, but follow it they must.Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001).

“”Thumbing your nose at the U.S. Supreme Court is almost unheard of in the judicial system,” said Kary Moss, ACLU of Michigan Executive Director.” U.S. District Judge Donald L. Graham made a command decision on his own motion to restrict Marcellus M. Mason’s right of access to the courts without giving him due process of law or notice and opportunity’s respond prior to the issuance of a pre-filing injunction on September 20, 2001. This denial represents an apparent snub and disdain for the United States Supreme Court and the Congress. Even more outrageous, is that the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal, has given its stamp of approval to Judge Graham’s disdain and contempt for the United States Supreme Court. The Eleventh Circuit has made the value judgment that Judge Graham’s career and reputation is more important than the life of a nobody like Marcellus M. Mason Jr. If Judge Graham and his enablers won’t respect the law and the United States Supreme Court then who should?

The Act That Defies the U.S. Supreme Court

On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham rendered a pre-fling injunction sua sponte, or on his motion and without notice to the litigant Marcellus M. Mason. See Docket Entry Number 878, (D.E. # 878) . Page 3, of this document boldly asserts: THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte. APPELLATE HISTORY. This injunction is commonly referred to under several different names: “leave to file injunction”, “vexatious litigant injunction”, “pre-filing injunction”, “filing injunction”, “1651 injunction”. This same injunction that was issued without notice and opportunity to respond also makes a “finding of bad faith”. At pages 5 and 6, Judge Graham specifically states:

It has become clear to the Court that Mason is proceeding in bad faith…Such activity is in bad faith and will not be permitted by the Court.

The sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction is unlawful for numerous reasons.

Definition of Willful

WILLFULLY – Committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something; voluntarily and intentionally assisting or advising another to do something that the person knows disobeys or disregards the law. A person does not act “willfully” if the person acts as a result of a good faith misunderstanding of the requirements of the law. See http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/w014.htm

.

Premise of This Post

Is Judge Donald L. Graham guilty of willfully defying the orders and opinions of the United States Supreme Court? If the reader wants to believe that Judge Graham is not willfully defying the United States Supreme Court in this case, then the reader will have to necessarily assume that Judge Graham is too stupid to know the law or is not competent. Judge Graham is many things, but not stupid and incompetent. This post will demonstrate that Judge Graham is arrogant and reckless. Defenders of Judge Graham who would say that his behavior has not been willful in this matter would have to make the following assumptions:

  • Well established legal principles that Judge Graham is legally presumed to know the law is not applicable in this matter.
  • Judge Graham, a federal Judge since 1992, has not read or is not otherwise familiar with the Eleventh Circuit’s or any of the other U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals opinions on pre-filing injunctions. Inherent in this assumption, you would also have to include the notion that Judge Graham who has free access to legal research services, Westlaw, Lexis Nexis, and host of free Internet Services such as Lexisone, Findlaw, and others, does not have access to the law. You would also have to assume, incorrectly, that the S.D. Fla. does not have a law library.
  • Judge Graham does not know that the right of access to the courts is constitutionally protected.
  • Judge Graham, a federal Judge since 1992, has not read or is not otherwise familiar with any of the Supreme Court’s many decisions dealing with the right of access to the courts
  • Judge Graham, a federal Judge since 1992, has not read or is not otherwise familiar with any of the Supreme Court’s many decisions dealing with due process.

The Supreme Court Says that A Judgment Issued in Violation of Due Process is Void

“A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). “[T]he constitution, by prohibiting an act, renders it void, if done; otherwise, the prohibition were nugatory. Thus, the warrant is a nullity.” Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 217 (1821). “’No judgment of a court is due process of law, if rendered without jurisdiction in the court, or without notice to the party.” Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 15 (1907). “A void judgment is from its inception a legal nullity.” Boch Oldsmobile, at 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990). Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 941 n. 19 (11th Cir. 1998) (“something that is null has no legal or binding force.”); Carter v. Fenner, at 136 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir. 1998)(“[a] void judgement is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect.”). “Courts are constituted by authority, and they cannot go beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.” Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 354 (1920).

Right of Access To Courts is Constitutionally Protected

The right of access to the Courts is clear according to the U.S. Supreme Court. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977);M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). The Supreme court has stated the right of access to the courts also protected by the First Amendment. BE&K Construction CO. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. 536 U.S. 516 (2001)(“the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government,” and that “[t]he right of access to the courts is … but one aspect of the right of petition.”). California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972)(“The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.“). See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)(recognizing “the fundamental right of access to the courts”); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)(“The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights.“).

Proof No. 1

A judge is legally presumed to know the law. U.S. v. HUMPHREYS (11th Cir. 1992). “Trial judges are presumed to know the law…” WALTON v. ARIZONA, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). The Eleventh Circuit and other courts are quick to assert this fact when a judge does not affirmatively address an aspect of law in a decision or opinion. Given this presumption, there is no reason not to apply it to this situation.

Proof No. 2

The best evidence that Judge Grahams knows that the right of access to the courts is constitutionally protected is Judge Graham’s own writing in the very sua sponte issued prefiling injunction of September 20, 2001. In this order, Teflon Don states:

This screening requirement best balances the interest in constitutionally mandated access to the federal courts with the need to protect the Court’s jurisdiction and integrity.

See pg. 7, Docket No. 878, (D.E. #878).

The U.S. Supreme Court,”SCOTUS”, On the Importance of Due Process

“Courts as well as citizens are not free ‘to ignore all the procedures of the law….’. The ‘constitutional freedom’ of which the Court speaks can be won only if judges honor the Constitution.” Walker v. City Of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 338 (1967)(Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting). “Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole, constitutional system.” Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring). It is ingrained in our national traditions, and is designed to maintain them. In a variety of situations, the Court has enforced this requirement by checking attempts of executives, legislatures, and lower courts to disregard the deep-rooted demands of fair play enshrined in the Constitution.” id. 161. “Fairness of procedure is “due process in the primary sense.” Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 281 U. S. 681. In a long line of cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that impingements of constitutional rights are, without variation, subject to the strictures of “due process” or notice and opportunity to be heard prior to their enactments. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Owen v. City Of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Carey v.Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).

Proof No. 3

Judge Graham knows that a constitutionally protected right is subject to due process. RODRIGUEZ v US, 169 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999) was a case about due process in which Judge Donald L. Graham presided over at the district court level, Case No. 97-1182-CV-DLG. See Findlaw.com, vlex.com. RODRIGUEZ cites Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)(“all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause). It is crystal clear that Judge Graham knows of the Supreme Court’s definition and affinity for due process. Even more compelling evidence that Judge Graham knew the law is Judge Graham’s own writings. At pages 6 and 7, of the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction, (DE #878), Judge Graham cites three cases for his nefarious deeds: Copeland v. Green, 949 F.2d 390 (11th Cir. 1991); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986)(en banc)); Cofield v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 518 (11th Cir. 1991). In Copeland v. Green, 949 F.2d 390 (11th Cir. 1991) the court lays out the procedure followed by the trial court or district court prior to issuing a pre-filing injunction. In Copeland, the court noted: “The district court entered an order requiring Copeland to appear and show cause why he should not be sanctioned for this abuse of his access to the court.” It is quite clear that the litigant in Copeland received notice and opportunity to respond prior to the issuance of the pre-filing injunction. Judge BARD TJOFLAT’s dissent in Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986)(en banc)), “The district court, noting the volume and nature of Procup’s previous litigation, issued an order to show cause why an injunction should not issue prohibiting Procup from filing any further pleadings in the district court.” Lastly, in Cofield v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 518 (11th Cir. 1991) the court noted that “the district court, sua sponte, issued an order to show cause asking why Cofield should not be sanctioned for his overly litigious behavior.” What better evidence of willfulness than Judge Graham’s own writings!

Proof No. 4

Judge Graham presided over Damiano v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 104 F.3d 328 (11th Cir. 1997) in S.D. Fla. Case No. 90-8415 CIV-DLG. See Findlaw.com. This case in no small part addresses itself to due process and the Supreme Court’s landmark case on the sufficiency of due process, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317-20 , 70 S.Ct. 652, 658-60, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). This opinion expressly cites Mullane. Consequently, it can not be argued that Judge Graham is not aware of the requirements of due process unless you assume that Judge Graham does not read his own cases.

Proof No. 5

Judge Graham played to what he thought was ignorance on the part of Marcellus Mason. Judge Graham cites a host of different cases to support the idea that he can restrict the filings of a litigant. Judge Graham is very slick and he knew that Mason had acquired the ability to do legal research when he rendered the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction, consequently Judge Graham made a conscious decision not to cite any any of the cases listed below that deal specifically with pre-filing injunctions . The cases cited by Judge Graham do not address pre-filing injunctions specifically. Peck v. Hoff, 660 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1981) is concerned with procedures for denying in forma pauperis. Incidentally, Judge Graham has defied the U.S. Supreme Court by defying in forma pauperis motions on some 18 occasions by refusing to offer a legally sufficient reason for these denials. See this site, post “Florida Judge Thumbs His Nose at U.S. Supreme Court Ruling on Poor People’s Right to Access The Courts“. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 n.8 (1989), this citation stands for the proposition of inherent power generally and not the procedures in involved in invoking “inherent power”. Martin Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993) this case deals with the authority to issue a pre-filing injunction, but not with the procedures for imposing an injunction, Cope v. Green, 949 F.2d 390 (11th Cir. 1991), Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986)(en banc)) ,

Proof No. 6

Judge Graham claims that he has inherent power to render a pre-filing injunction. See pgs. 6,7 (D.E. #878). The United States Supreme Court has stated:

A court must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power, and it must comply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees.” (emphasis added) Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991). Are we to believe that a federal judge who relies upon “inherent power” to issue an order is unaware of Supreme Court’s Chambers opinion? At the latest, Judge Graham would have became aware of Chambers would have been on October 16, 2002 when the Eleventh Circuit rendered their opinion and actually cited Chambers. See Appeal From Hell Opinion, pg. 10. As stated above, this appeal is joke and an exercise in artifice and dishonesty. See “Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664: The Appeal From Hell“. What has stopped Judge Graham from coming forward and admitting error?

Proof No. 7

Judge Graham has had numerous filings and documents since the institution of the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001 that expressly quotes and cites the United States Supreme Court and others, but yet Teflon Don has been intransigent and has sat on his ass and did nothing. One of these filings was a judicial misconduct complaint, 05-0011 that was submitted January 31, 2005. This complaint specifically mentions Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991). On or about February 5, 2005, Judge Graham received a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in Eleventh Circuit Case No. 05-10623 that specifically mentions Chambers and a host of other legal authorities setting forth the due process requirements involved in issuing pre-filing injunctions. See pages 8-10, Petition for Writ of Mandamus. On or about February 13, 2004, Judge Graham received a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in Eleventh Circuit Case No. 04-11894 that specifically mentions Chambers and a host of other legal authorities setting forth the due process requirements involved in issuing pre-filing injunctions. See pages 11-15, Mandamus Petition. Judge Graham is in possession of a letter that mailed to him on May 3, 2008 that specifically sets forth Supreme Court requirements with respect to due process and the right of access to the courts and as of this date, May 31 2008, Judge Graham has refused to comply with the decisions and orders of the Supreme Court. On September 7, 2002, Judge Graham received a “MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY, PLAINTIFF’S DEMAND TO RESCIND INJUNCTION FORTHWITH, AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PUBLICATION“, (D.E. 914). At pages 10-14, this motion specifically sets forth the legal requirements for issuing a pre-filing injunction and for invoking the “inherent power” of the court according to the United States Supreme Court. On January 31, 2003, Judge Graham rejected the authority of the United States Supreme Court. See (D.E. #928).

Enabling Acts of the Eleventh Circuit

Judge Graham and his enablers at the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal see nothing wrong with Judge Graham disrespecting the United States Supreme Court. In what can only be described as a pure act of artifice and dishonesty, the Eleventh Circuit struck Marcellus M. Mason’s brief in a direct appeal, Case No. 01-13664, for arguing that the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001 was not lawful because they said it was “beyond the scope of appeal”; however, when the Eleventh Circuit decided the appeal it then used the same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001 to affirm Judge Graham. Equally remarkable is the fact that the Eleventh Circuit was quite unwilling to pass on the validity of this very same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001. See full story at “Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664: The Appeal From Hell“. This a remarkable opinion that mocks the idea of “judicial independence”.

Judge Graham criminalized his own his disrespect and contempt for the United States Supreme Court by making the same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001 the subject of a criminal contempt complaint. The Eleventh Circuit knew of this concocted criminalization and disdain for the United States Supreme Court by Teflon Don, but yet it sat idly by and did nothing while the clearly void sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001 being used to persecute and oppress Marcellus Mason. The Eleventh Circuit has deployed acts of artifice and dishonesty to avoid reviewing the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001 for validity. See post this site, “Eleventh Circuit Sits Idly By While A Clearly Void Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction Wreaks Havoc On A Man’s Life“.

Case Law On Pre-Filing Injunctions

US CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS HAVE ROUTINELY REJECTED “SUA SPONTE” PRE-FILING INJUNCTIONS.

A long line of United States appellate courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, have rejected sua sponte issuances of pre-filing injunctions because they are violations of due process. In Weaver v. Leon County Sch. Bd., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8128 (11th Cir. 2006), the Eleventh Circuit held that a litigant was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a restriction was imposed on his ability to challenge an injunction. U.S. v. Powerstein, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 14928,*;185 Fed. Appx. 811 (11th Cir. 2006)(litigant entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the court imposed the injunctive order ). See Sires v. Fair, 107 F.3d 1;1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2173 (1st Cir. 1997); Cok v. Family Court of Rhode Island , 985 F.2d 32 (C.A.1 (R.I.), 1993) (vacating a pre-fling injunction issued without notice); MLE Realty Assocs. v. Handler, 192 F.3d 259, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23362 (2nd Cir. 1999) ; Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2000) ; Holton v. Oral Surg. Sing Sing Corr., 24 Fed. Appx. 37; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25151 (2nd Cir. 2001); Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 1998) (district court may not impose a filing injunction on a litigant without providing the litigant with notice and an opportunity to be heard.); Gonzales v. Feiner, 131 Fed. Appx. 373, * 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8370, ** (3rd Cir. 2005) ; Wiliams v. Cambridge Integrated Servs. Group , 148 Fed Appx. 87, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 18624 (3rd Cir. 2005) ; Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027 (C.A.3 (Virgin Islands), 1992)(vacating a sua sponte issued injunction); It is imperative that the court afford the litigant notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to issuing such an injunction. In Re Head, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8265,*;174 Fed. Appx. 167 (4th Cir. 2006)(vacated a 10 yr. old sua sponte injunction); Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 819 (4th Cir. 2004)(vacating a pre-filing injunction issued without notice); Tucker v. Drew, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 11784 (4 th Cir. 1994) ;DOUGLAS BAUM v. BLUE MOON VENTURES, LLC , 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 91,*;513 F.3d 181;49 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 68 (5th Cir. 2008)(“Notice and a hearing are required if the district court sua sponte imposes a pre-filing injunction or sua sponte modifies an existing injunction to deter vexatious filings.”) ;De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir.) ; Roscoe v. Hansen, 107 F.3d 880;1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4996 (10th Cir. 1997); Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20966,*;500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007)(litigant must be given notice and a chance to be heard before the [injunctive] order is entered.); Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351,354 (C.A.10 (Wyo.), 1989)(vacated and holding that the litigant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to oppose the court’s order before it is instituted.); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F.Supp. 146 (M.D. Fla., 1983)(court issued a show cause order) Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1110 (C.A.11 (Fla.), 1985) (held that district court did give adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before issuance of the injunction); Cofield v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm., 936 F.2d 512, 514 (11th Cir.1991)(noting that court issued show cause order prior to rendering pre-fling injunction); In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C.Cir.1988)(reversing and holding If a pro se litigant is to be deprived of such a vital constitutional right as access to the courts, he should, at least, be provided with an opportunity to oppose the entry of an order restricting him before it is entered.); Martin v. Circuit Court, 627 So.2d 1298 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., 1993)(reversing a pre-filing order and holding that limiting the constitutional right of access to the courts, essential due process safeguards must first be provided); Lawsuits of Carter, In re, 510 S.E.2d 91, 95; 235 Ga.App. 551 (Ga. App., 1998)(reversing a pre-filing injunction because notice or an opportunity not given); Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that injunctions “may not be expanded beyond the meaning of its terms absent notice and an opportunity to be heard.”).

Courts have felt that the notice and opportunity to respond was so important that they have reversed district courts even where they thought the pre-filing injunction was otherwise valid. See Oliver, In re, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (C.A.3 (Pa.), 1982); Scott v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage , 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15709,*;143 Fed. Appx. 525(4th Cir. 2005); Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987).