Posts Tagged ‘construed’

Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal, Masters of Jugglery: Jurisdictional Challenge Converted To Summary Reversal Motion To Achieve Desired Outcome

June 28, 2008

Justice Turned On Its Head

Judge Donald L. GrahamJudge Donald L. Graham, “Teflon Don”
He’s a bad motherf^%##, Shut your mouth!

Point of This Post

This post will document how the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal, used jugglery to avoid an outcome that the facts and the law would have required. Jugglery is defined as manipulation or trickery especially to achieve a desired end. This matter concerns an appeal in the Eleventh Circuit, Case No. 01-13664 and District Court Case No. 99-14027-CIV-DLG, Judge Donald L. Graham, presiding. In this matter, the Eleventh Circuit converted a motion to determine jurisdiction that it must satisfy to a summary reversal motion that is discretionary. Having recharacterized the motion, the Eleventh Circuit, without citing any facts, simply said the summary reversal was not warranted. Simply put, the Eleventh Circuit refused to state why it had jurisdiction. This post is a part of the overall scheme to land a knockout blow to the American Bar Association’s koolaid of “Judicial Independence”. The ABA’s emphasis is on “Judicial Independence” and it resists “interference” from outsiders-Congress of the United States, Layman review boards. The ABA has said: “There are checks on the judiciary and channels to correct improper decisions. The appeal process affords litigants the opportunity to challenge a judicial ruling. About Us – ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence. This is the idealistic and theoretical basis for “Judicial Independence”; however, the reality or actual practice does not equal the ideals. Suppose for a moment that such a system does not work. Federal Judges will take extreme measures to avoid disciplining a colleague federal judge. See Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664: The Appeal From Hell for even more dishonest jurisprudence. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit will do anything to achieve the desired outcome. Two posts at this site,, document how the Eleventh Circuit will do anything to achieve the desired outcome as the Eleventh took two different and inconsistent positions with respect to the jurisdiction of the lower court or Judge Graham during the appeal of this very appeal. See Eleventh Circuit: Notice of Appeal Does Not Divest District Judge of Jurisdiction of Matters Involved In the Appeal! and Putrid Dishonesty:Beyond the Scope of Appeal.


Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree, It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company Of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994). “The courts, no less than the political branches of the government, must respect the limits of their authority.” Catholic Conf. v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, 487 U.S. 72 (1988)..

ISSUE: Whether the Eleventh Circuit Had Jurisdiction of the Appeal?

The Appellant submitted a Motion To Determine Jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court has stated in case after case that a jurisdictional challenge maybe raised at any time. Moreover, both courts have stated that all courts are under an independent obligation to review its jurisdiction even if no party raises the issue. In this matter, rather than discuss why or why it did not have jurisdiction of the appeal the Eleventh Circuit converted the Motion To Determine Jurisdiction in to a motion for summary reversal. Having converted the motion into a summary reversal, a discretionary form of relief, the Eleventh Circuit, in a mere conclusory fashion simply asserted that the standards for a summary reversal were not met. Rather than construing the Motion To Determine Jurisdiction, a pro se motion, liberally to achieve substantial justice, the Eleventh Circuit construed the motion to achieve its own end.

Eleventh Circuit’s Response to Jurisdictional Challenge

On April 15, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit stated: “Appellant’s “motion to determine jurisdiction,” and “motion to determine subject matter jurisdiction and standing,” which are construed as motions for summary reversal, and are DENIED.” See Order Denying Jurisdiction.

On May 17, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit stated:

“Appellant’s motion for clarification is GRANTED, and this Court’s April 15, 2002, Order clarified as follows: Appellant’s motions, which were construed as motions for summary reversal, were denied because Appellant failed to meet the standards for summary disposition. See Groendyke Transport v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012, 89 S.Ct. 1628, 23 L.Ed.2d 39 (1969).”

See Order Granting Clarification.

Citing the Law and omitting the facts, an all too familiar tactic of the Eleventh Circuit, is that decisions are made with recitation to a court case with no recitation to the facts of the instant case

What Do You Know From Reading The Order?

This post was designed with the decision first for the purpose of accentuating the lack of information in decision not to discuss jurisdiction. Reading only the decision above, answer the following questions:

  • Why does the Eleventh Circuit have jurisdiction?
  • What is the law regarding jurisdiction on appeal?
  • What are the facts that support the decision?
  • Why did the Eleventh Circuit construe the motion to determine jurisdiction as a motion for summary reversal?
  • Who benefited by construing the motion as a motion for summary reversal?

Law On Jurisdiction

[T]he Supreme Court has ruled that “it is not proper for federal courts to proceed immediately to a merits question despite jurisdictional objections.” In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association, 173 F.3d 866; 335 U.S. App. D.C. 327 (C.A.D.C. 1999)(citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1012, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (without proper jurisdiction, a court cannot proceed at all, but can only note the jurisdictional defect and dismiss the suit)”). “On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes. This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it.Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94. See also UNITED STATES of America v. Mery GIRALDO-PRADO, 150 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 1998) (“We have noted that a party may raise jurisdiction at any time during the pendency of the proceedings.”);

In a case involving Judge Graham, United States Of America v. Machado, No. 05-11420, D. C. Docket No. 97-00238-CR-DLG, 465 F.3d 1301pgs. 8,9 (11th Cir. 2006);2006 US App (11th) 398, the Eleventh Circuit held:

We are aware, of course, that “subject-matter jurisdiction . . . can never be forfeited or waived” and “[c]onsequently, defects in subject-matter jurisdiction require correction regardless of whether the error was raised in district court,” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 1785 (2002); see also Arbaugh v. Y& H Corp., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1240 (2006) (“The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction . . . may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.”). That principle is not, however, an exception to the requirements for appellate jurisdiction, and if those requirements are not met we cannot review whether a judgment is defective, not even where the asserted defect is that the district court lacked jurisdiction.

The Eleventh Circuit had a duty to not only review its own jurisdiction, but that of the lower court as well. Even if the neither the parties raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction the Eleventh Circuit is required to do so on its motion or sua sponte. See ALFRED L. BOCHESE v. TOWN OF PONCE INLET, No. 04-11542, 405 F.3d 964 (11th Cir. 2005)(“Although the parties have not raised the issue here, we are obliged to consider, sua sponte, the question of our subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case before us.“),

Federal courts are “obligated to inquire into subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking. “As a threshold matter, therefore, we must initially determine both whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider Williams’ Rule 60(b) motion and whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of his motion.” WAYNE BERTRAM WILLIAMS v. BRUCE CHATMAN, No. 06-16115 (11th Cir. 2007),,(citing Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1179 (11th Cir. 2004)). “An appellate court has a duty to consider sua sponte whether appellate jurisdiction is properly invoked.” John Andrew Mattingly v. Farmers State Bank, No.98-3234 (6th Cir. 1998), ELECTRONIC CITATION: 1998 FED App. 0262P (6th Cir.) File Name: 98a0262p.06 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 740 (1976)).

“When a colorable question exists, an appellate court has an unflagging obligation to inquire sua sponte into its own jurisdiction.” Charlesbank Equity Fund Ii v. Blinds To Go, Inc., 370 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 2004).

Construed or Screwed

“Federal courts sometimes will ignore the legal label that a pro se litigant attaches to a motion and recharacterize the motion in order to place it within a different legal category. They may do so in order to avoid an unnecessary dismissal, to avoid inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling requirements, or to create a better correspondence between the substance of a pro se motion’s claim and its underlying legal basis. ” Castro v. United States (02-6683) 540 U.S. 375 (2003). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” United States Of America v. Pierre Castma , No. 07-13531 (11th Cir. 2005)(quoting Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1908 (2007)).See also United States Of America v. Gary William Holt, No. 04-15848, 417 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 2005)(“noting that a pro se motion should be liberally construed to afford review on any “legally justifiable base”)(citing Sanders v. United States, 113 F.3d 184, 187 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (noting that a pro se motion should be liberally construed to afford review on any “legally justifiable base”)).

The clear intent of liberal construction is for the benefit of the pro se litigant and not to the detriment of the pro se litigant. In this matter, the Eleventh Circuit construed a Motion to Determine Jurisdiction to motion for summary reversal. This “construction” or recharacterization was to the detriment of Mason. The Eleventh Circuit took a mandatory motion which required it to assert facts and law to support both its jurisdiction and that of the lower court and converted it to a “summary reversal” motion. Had the Eleventh been unable to sufficiently support its jurisdiction and that of the lower court would have required a dismissal of the appeal. The Eleventh Circuit ran ahead to the finish line and saw who was going to win the race, consequently they changed the rules to guarantee the winner or outcome of the race. The Eleventh then construed the motion to determine jurisdiction into a motion for summary reversal which is a discretionary. Once the motion became discretionary, the Eleventh Circuit was free to avoid the outcome the facts would have demanded. It is difficult not to conclude that the rules were construed to achieve the desired outcome-vindication of Judge Graham.

Internal Operating Procedure

The Eleventh Circuit’s internal rules allows them to raise a jurisdictional issue at their discretion. 11th Cir. R. 31-1(e) (1999)states:

(e) Jurisdictional Question. If, upon review of the district court docket entries, order and/or judgment appealed from, and the notice of appeal, it appears that this court may lack jurisdiction over the appeal, the court may request counsel and pro se parties to advise the court in writing of their position with respect to the jurisdictional question(s) raised. The issuance of a jurisdictional question does not stay the time for filing briefs otherwise provided by this rule.

Motion To Determine Jurisdiction

Appellant’s Motion To Determine Jurisdiction was submitted on or about March 13, 2002. See Docket and Motion. This motion argued that the Eleventh Circuit did not have jurisdiction of the appeal because the alleged violations of preliminary injunctions, or orders that were granted on June 19, 2000, (DE #201), and July 25, 2000, (DE #246) were not lawful for the following reasons:

  • Magistrate is without legal authority to issue an injunction or a restraining order. See Motion, pps. 3,5-6.
  • These orders are invalid because the Defendants failed to file a complaint for an injunction or a restraining order.
  • These orders failed to meet the requirements for a “temporary Injunction” or “TRO”. See Motion, pg. 6,7.

Case Cited By Eleventh Circuit Supports Appellant

The Eleventh Circuit cited Groendyke Transport v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012, 89 S.Ct. 1628, 23 L.Ed.2d 39 (1969) for the proposition that a “summary reversal” was not warranted. However, Groendyke Transport actually supports Mason’s or the Appellant position. Firstly, Groendyke Transport, like the instant case involved the question of the validity of an injunction. Groendyke Transport, set forth two conditions that would warrant a summary disposal:

  • “The first comprises those cases where time is truly of the essence. This includes situations where important public policy issues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied.”
  • Second, are those in which the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case…

The where rights delayed are rights denied position favors Mason. The injunctions issued in the instant case concerned First Amendment rights. These injunctions prohibited direct communications with the government. Secondly, one of the injunctions, (D.E. #246)(“”Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants’ counsel including any requests for public records.), implicated Florida Public Record requests. It is well settled and unremarkable that the “the loss of constitutional rights for even a minimal amount of time constitutes irreparable harm.” See Taubman Company v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2002). More importantly, according to the Supreme Court: “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); same 11th Cir., Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir. 1983)(“It is well settled that the loss of First Amendment freedoms for even minimal periods of time constitutes irreparable injury justifying the grant of a preliminary injunction.“); Gresham v. Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir. 1984)(“first amendment rights violated sufficient to show irreparable injury because loss of first amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury“) .

The one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law condition favors Mason the appellant. The best argument in support of the appellant is lack of legal citation or facts by the Eleventh Circuit. More importantly, the law favored Mason because a Magistrate can not issue an injunction. Assuming arguendo, a Magistrate could issue an injunction, Mason would have prevailed because order fails to meet the 4 prong requirements for a preliminary injunction.


Marcellus M. Mason, Jr. of Sebring, Fl. filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against the Highlands County Board of County Commissioners and Heartland Library Cooperative and other governmental entities and individual government employees in February 1999. This case was ultimately assigned to Judge Donald L. Graham and Magistrate Frank Lynch Jr., Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham/Lynch. After protracted litigation, the case was dismissed, not on the merits of the case, but based upon banned and irrelevant out of court constitutionally protected and legal communications between Highlands County and Mason. “R&R” (D.E. 766), Order adopting R&R (D.E 791). See Banned Communications. In June and July 2000, Maria Sorolis and Brian Koji, Allen, Norton & Blue asked the Magistrate to grant them preliminary injunctions that required Mason to contact them before he could talk to the government defendants. These orders required Mason, a nonlawyer, living in Sebring, FL to contact private attorneys some 90 miles away in Tampa, FL . These orders were granted on June 19, 2000 and July 25, 2000 in part stated:

Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case.” (DE #201). This order is dated June 19, 2000,

Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants’ counsel including any requests for public records.” (DE #246). “Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case.” (). This order is dated July 25, 2000.

Judge Graham has expressly stated that the issuance of the injunctions by Magistrate Judge Frank Lynch, Jr. was not “clearly erroneous nor is it contrary to law. See Docket Entry No. 407. However, Congress and the law disagree as the law expressly states that: “Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary— a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief…,” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

On March 2, 2001, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners attorneys, Allen, Norton & Blue, filed a “DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS IN THE FORM OF DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S ACTION AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW“. See Docket Entry No. 511. This motion sought dismissal of the lawsuit due to alleged out of court communications with the Highlands County Government in violation the injunctions mentioned above,DE #201) and (DE #246). On April 9, 2001, the Defendants’ filed a second motion for sanctions in the form of dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit for more alleged out of court communications between Mason and the Highlands County Government. See Docket Entry No. 646. On May 31, 2001, the Magistrate, Frank Lynch, Jr., prepared a Report and Recommendation, “R&R”, recommending that the lawsuit be dismissed because of these out of court communications between Mason and his local government, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners. Judge Graham accepted this R&R in whole with no changes or comments.

The Case was closed on June 20, 2001. Docket Entry No. 791. A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 25, 2001. (Docket Entry 795). District Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham was assigned Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664. Consequently, the court never reached the merits of the lawsuit as there were motions for summary judgments pending when the case was closed. See Docket Sheet, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 769);(Doc. 770), and the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as well, (Doc. 507); (Doc. 667); (Doc. 668); (Doc. 706); (Doc. 797).

Refusal To Cite Legal Authority

Judge Graham and his Magistrate, Frank Lynch, Jr. have repeatedly refused to cite legal authority for these orders, (DE #201) and (DE #246), which required Mason to seek the approval of private attorneys, Allen, Norton & Blue, prior to petitioning the government. See Court Orders: (DE #201), (DE #246);(Doc. #279);(Doc. 281);(Doc. #407);(Doc. #524);(Doc. #528);(Doc. #634);(Doc. 673);(Doc. 744);(Doc. 745);(Doc. 766);(Doc. 791);(Doc. 874, pg. 2);(Doc. 882, pgs. 1-2); (DE-890); (DE-928);(DE-931)).

US Circuit Judge Ed Carnes Undermines U.S. Supreme Court By Imposing Hobson’s Choice

May 23, 2008

Judge Donald L. GrahamJudge Donald L. Graham, “Teflon Don

A United States Circuit Judge on the Potential Dangers of Unpublished Opinions

It was U.S. Circuit Judge Richard S. Arnold, 8th Cir. U.S. Court of Appeal who said:

“If, for example, a precedent is cited, and the other side then offers a distinction, and the judges on the panel cannot think of a good answer to the distinction, but nevertheless, for some extraneous reason, wish to reject it, they can easily do so through the device of an abbreviated, unpublished opinion, and no one will ever be the wiser. (I don’t say that judges are actually doing this–only that the temptation exists.) Or if, after hearing argument, a judge in conference thinks that a certain decision should be reached, but also believes that the decision is hard to justify under the law, he or she can achieve the result, assuming agreement by the other members of the panel, by deciding the case in an unpublished opinion and sweeping the difficulties under the rug. Again, I’m not saying that this has ever occurred in any particular case, but a system that encourages this sort of behavior, or is at least open to it, has to be subject to question in any world in which judgesare human beings.”

1 J. App. Prac. & Process 219 (1999). UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS: A COMMENT, Richard S. Arnold, Copyright © 1999 University of Arkansas – Little Rock School of Law ; Richard S. Arnold.Judge Arnold, now deceased, cannot be resting comfortably. In Anastasoff. v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), Judge Arnold and his panel declared unpublished opinions to be unconstitutional. This opinion was subsequently vacated on other grounds, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) by an en banc court.

Purpose of this Post

This post will take an Opinion of Judge Ed Carnes and demonstrate that he nefariously contorted the law and facts in order to achieve the desired outcome. The desired outcome was a vindication of Judge Donald L. Graham by any means necessary. Judge Carnes ruled that a Magistrate’s designation of his own order is controlling on an U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal. The purpose of this post is to:

  • To establish the opinion in this post as a part of an overall pattern and practice of lawlessness.
  • To set forth facts to prove that there is two bodies of law. The “rule of law” as set forth in published opinions and a secret underground body of law set forth in unpublished opinions that have little or nothing to do with the “rule of law”.
  • To show that a Circuit Court Judge will contort the law beyond common sense and even to absurdity in order to achieve the desired outcome.
  • To show the extreme measures federal judges will employ to protect each other.
  • To show how pervasive dishonesty is among the federal judiciary.
  • To help make the argument that “judicial independence” equals judicial non-accountability.
  • To show how a judge can fit the “facts” and the law around desired outcome and place the document beyond public scrutiny.
  • To demonstrate that the federal judicial process needs the disinfectant of sunlight and public scrutiny.
  • To show that a United States Circuit Judge can take the enactments of the U.S. Congress and the decisions of United States Supreme Court and reduce them mere meaningless pieces of paper.

Preliminary Injunctions or Orders at Issue

On June 13, 2000, Maria Sorolis, Allen, Norton & Blue, attorney for Highlands County Board of County Commissioners and Heartland Library Cooperative, filed a motion entitled “DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION“. See Docket Entry 199. This motion expressly states the following:

  • “undersigned counsel and each of them hereby moves the Court for an Injunction prohibiting the Plaintiff, Marcellus Mason, from contacting directly,’ via correspondence, electronic mail, telephonically, or otherwise, any supervisor or employee of any of the Defendants in the above-styled litigation.”
  • “WHEREFORE, Defendants move the Court for an injunction prohibiting Plaintiff from contacting any of the Defendants and/or their supervisory employees,..”

This motion was quickly granted on June 19, 2000. it took the Magistrate just six days or less if mail time is included to grant this motion. On June 19, 2000, Federal Magistrate Frank Lynch Jr. issued the following order:

[I]t is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED…Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case.

See Docket Entry No. 201. Incidentally, this order clearly violates Mason’s rights to respond to a motion under Local Rule 7.1.C which states: “Each party opposing a motion shall serve an opposing memorandum of law not later than ten days after service of the motion as computed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

On July 6, 2000, Maria Sorolis filed a motion entitled “DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.” See Docket Entry No. 231. Moreover, the motion specifically asks for the following:

  • “Highlands County Board of County Commissioners, Heartland Library Cooperative, Fred Carino, and Mary Myers, by and through their undersigned counsel, and regrettably renew their Motion to the Court for entry of a Preliminary Injunction against the Plaintiff in this matter, “”
  • “WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully renew their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction prohibiting the Plaintiff from contacting the supervisory employees of the Defendants or the individual Defendants directly, and directing Plaintiff to make all public records requests through the undersigned counsel”

On July 25, 2000, Federal Magistrate Frank Lynch Jr. issued the following order:

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED… Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants’ counsel including any requests for public records.”

See Docket Entry No. 246. Incidentally, at least three courts have found similar injunctions to be unconstitutional. see Lewis v. S. S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1976)(reversing an order which prohibited appellant from “discussing, directly or indirectly, settlement . . . with the plaintiffs” and from “contacting, communicating, or in any way interfering with the attorney-client relationship” as “too sweeping a restraint”); Bernard v. Gulf-Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), aff’d, 452 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981),( explicitly held that requiring the litigant to meet the Court’s “post-communication filing requirements” of constitutionally protected communication was unconstitutional.). Additionally, in Test Masters Educational Services, Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 579 (Fed. 5th Cir., 2005) the court held that an order which enjoined a litigant “from communicating directly with, threatening, or harassing Test Masters Educational Services, Inc., its employees, its staff, or TES’s counsel, counsel’s employees, or counsel’s staff” constituted an invalid prior restraint and a unconstitutional limitation on free speech.

Hobson’s Choice

Merriam-Webster has defined a hobson’s choice as:
1 : an apparently free choice when there is no real alternative
2 : the necessity of accepting one of two or more equally objectionable alternatives

On April 26, 2001, Judge Ed Carnes asserted:

“With regard to his requests for relief from the order granting the defendants motions for preliminary injunction, which the court construed as a preliminary discovery motion, Mason has an alternative remedy. He may either comply with the district courts discovery order and challenge it on appeal from the final judgment. or refuse to comply with the order and challenge its validity if cited for contempt. See Rouse Constr. Int’l. Inc. v. Rouse Censtr. Corp., 680 F.2d 743, 745 (11th Cir. 1982).

This is a classical hobson’s choice as Judge Ed Carnes presented Mason with two equally objectionable alternatives:

  • Lose his First Amendment right to petition the government directly during the pendency of the lawsuit; or
  • Fail to comply with a court order and risk contempt and a dismissal of an employment discrimination lawsuit.

Judge Carnes view of the law, according to Judge Carnes own previously and subsequently opinions for which he was panel member, is incorrect and not sustainable under the “rule of law”. The orders in question are reviewable immediately for three reasons:

  • The orders are both de facto and de jure injunctions.
  • The orders have the “practical effect” of being injunctions. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that orders have the “practical effect” of being injunctions are immediately reviewable.
  • The orders, notwithstanding any label, cause irreparable harm according to the United States Supreme Court and Judge Carnes own writings.

Constitutional Right to Petition the Government

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” First Amendment, US Constitution.

Right To Interlocutory Appeal

28 U.S.C.§ 1292(a)(1) states:

(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court;

“Certain orders that are not final in the sense of ending the litigation on the merits are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). To come within this doctrine, an order “must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v. SOLOMON, 936 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1991). It is difficult to imagine how you can get back First Amendment rights once you have lost them at the end of trial whose date is indeterminate.

With respect 1292(a)(1), the Eleventh Circuit has “construed the statute narrowly to ensure that appeal as of right under Sec. 1292(a)(1) will be available only in circumstances where an appeal will further the statutory purpose of “permit[ting] litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence.” Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, [348 U.S. 176,] 181, 75 S.Ct. [249,] 252[, 99 L.Ed.2d 233 (1955) ]. Unless a litigant can show that an interlocutory order of the district court might have a “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,” and that the order can be “effectually challenged” only by immediate appeal, the general congressional policy against piecemeal review will preclude interlocutory appeal.”CABLE HOLDINGS OF BATTLEFIELD, INC. v. COOKE, 764 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir. 1985).


Judge Carnes’ opinion evinces absurdity and is contrary to law. Inherent in Judge Carnes opinion is the inane notion that a United States Circuit Court of Appeal is bound by a Magistrate’s designation of a “discovery order” and may not review the substance of that order to determine for itself if the “discovery order” is in fact an injunction. If this true, then a Magistrate can issue an injunction and escape appellate review by simply calling an injunction something other than an injunction. “[T]the name which the judge gives the order is not determinative”. Geneva Assur. v. Medical Emergency Services, 964 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1992). Judge Carnes was a member of the appellate panel that concluded that “where the order has the effect of a preliminary injunction this court has jurisdiction to review the order and is not bound by the district court’s designation of the order.” See Cuban American Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995). More importantly, In Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) the Supreme Court expressly rejected this line of contorted reasoning:

“A district court, if it were able to shield its orders from appellate review merely by designating them as temporary restraining orders, rather than as preliminary injunctions, would have virtually unlimited authority over tie parties in all injunctive proceeding.”

Irreparable Harm

The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). Judge Marcus himself, in a published decision, has stated: “Regarding irreparable injury, it is well established that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” KH OUTDOOR, LLC v. TRUSSVILLE, CITY OF, 458 F.3d 1261; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 19901; 19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 902 (11th Cir. 2006)(citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2690 (1976) (plurality opinion)).

“An order has the practical effect of granting injunctive relief within the meaning of section 1292(a)(1) if it is directed to a party, enforceable by contempt, and designed to accord or protect some or all of the substantive relief sought by a complaint,(internal citations and quotations omitted), and if the appealing party demonstrates serious, perhaps irreparable, consequences”. HBE LEASING CORPORATION v. FRANK,48 F.3d 623 (2nd Cir. 1994). Using Judge Carnes own words, above, the orders would possibly subject Mason to contempt of court charges, “challenge its validity if cited for contempt.”

According to the Supreme Court, an order that has practical effect of denying or granting an injunction iis immediately appealable if a “litigant can show that an interlocutory order of the district court might have a “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,” and that the order can be “effectually challenged” only by immediate appeal,…”Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981).

The Ultimate Act of Dishonesty

The ultimate act of dishonesty was that Judge Graham dismissed a lawsuit based upon alleged violations of the injunctions enumerated above and the Eleventh Circuit refused to review these orders for validity. Highlands County asked and got Judge Graham to dismiss a lawsuit because of alleged violations of these orders, which Mason contended on appeal, were illegal. To further illustrate the exreme measures deployed to vindicate Judge Graham personally and more dishonesty see how the Eleventh Circuit was willing to discuss Mason’s alleged violations of these orders while steadfastly refusing to review these very orders for validity, see posts, “Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664: The Appeal From Hell” and “Eleventh Circuit Repeatedly Refuses To Review Orders For Validity“). Highlands County filed two motions for sanctions in the form of dismissal of the plaintiff’s lawsuit. Docket Entry Nos. 511 and 646. These motions depicted out of court communications between Highlands County and the Plaintiff, Marcellus Mason. Judge Graham and his Magistrate granted these motions and dismissed the case on June 20, 2001. See Docket Entry Nos. 766 an and 791. The following alleged out of court lawful communications were used to dismiss the lawsuit.

(D.E. 511, ¶6, PG.3)

On February 13, 2001, Plaintiff appeared at Fred Carino’s office and demanded to view attorney billing records from Defendant Highlands County ’s counsel relevant to its defense of his litigation.

D.E. 511, ¶7, PG.3)

On February 14, 2001, Plaintiff returned to Fred Carino’s office and demanded to view attorney billing records from Defendant Highlands County ’s counsel relevant to its defense of his litigation. This request was made directly to Mr. Canno’s office and not through Defendant Highlands County ’s counsel.

D.E. 511, ¶8, PG.4)

After reviewing the, records, Mr. Mason penned a note to Mr. Carino stating that he wanted unredacted portions of billing records and if he did not get them he will file a lawsuit by February 16, 2001

D.E. 511, ¶9, PG.4).

(D.E. 646, ¶10, PG.3)

Clearly, Plaintiffs “no trespass” and tortious interference claims were an integral part of Plaintiffs present litigation, and involve the same set of facts that Plaintiff continues to rely on in pursuing his present claims. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint alleged several causes of action based on the issuance of the “no trespass” warnings against Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff’s “no trespass” claims were ultimately dismissed by the Court (D.E.’s #435; 466), Plaintiff has recently indicated his intent to appeal the Court’s dismissal of all claims in his Fourth Amended Complaint. (Exhibit 2). Consequently, the issuance of the “no trespass” warnings against Plaintiff are still part of this present litigation.

(D.E. 646, ¶11, PG.4)

In addition, Plaintiff’s communications regarding Defendants’ counsel’s Eleventh Circuit “track record” clearly have no relevance to his state court claim(s), and pertain only to his federal litigation.

(D.E. 646, ¶12, PG.4)